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UNITED STATES–JORDANIAN RELATIONS AND ARMS SUPPLY ISSUES

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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UNITED STATES-JORDANIAN RELATIONS AND ARMS SUPPLY ISSUES

TUESDAY, JULY 29, 1980

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE OM EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:05 p.m., in room H–236, the Capitol, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. The meeting of the subcommittee will come to order.

Today the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East meets to consider a proposed sale of tanks to Jordan.

On July 23, 1980, the Committee on Foreign Affairs was notified in Transmittal No. 80–82, pursuant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, of the U.S. Government's intention to issue a letter of offer to Jordan for the sale of 100 M–60A3 tanks valued at $159.5 million.

Several Members have asked for a hearing on this sale. Members will recall that the subject of this sale was discussed at length a year ago in a hearing on August 1, 1979, at a time when we had received a prenotification for the sale of 300 such tanks to Jordan. In the interim, Jordan's plans have apparently changed.

We are happy to have with us today to discuss this sale the same witnesses who appeared a year ago. They are Hon. Harold H. Saunders Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, and Lt. Gen. Ernest Graves, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defense.

Mr. Saunders, you have a prepared statement which will be entered into the record in full. You may proceed.

General Graves, do you have a statement also?

General GRAVES. No, sir, I do not.

Mr. HAMILTON. All right. Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD H. SAUNDERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. SAUNDERS. We will put the full statement which you have before you in the record. I thought the best way to proceed would simply be to make a few of the key points that are covered in that statement orally here just to start us off.

U.S. MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN

Our military supply relationship with Jordan, as you know, has been rooted in our larger relationship over more than two decades. That relationship is based on a number of common interests: First of all, the security and stability of Jordan itself, which is an important factor in the stability of the area, including the security of Israel; second, Jordanian interests in maintaining an armed force of moderate and balanced proportions; third, Jordanian readiness to play an effective role in helping to maintain the stability of the region as a whole; fourth, Jordanian prevention of terrorism from its own territory; and fifth, Jordanian commitment to negotiate peace with Israel within the framework of Resolution 242.

Jordan has over more than two decades increasingly relied on the United States as the main external supporter of its defense forces. One of the issues in this decision before you today, therefore, is whether those nations in the Middle East who are willing to look to the United States as the leader of the free world for continuing cooperation and maintaining their own security can continue to depend on the United States.

Each nation in the Middle East who looks to us for that kind of support has a stake in U.S. reliability and constancy. The issue before us has sometimes been posed in terms of opposition to our adding to the arms inventory of Jordan and other Arab nations in any way. It seems to me the issue should be otherwise stated. It seems to me the issue is rather whether our additions to Arab arms inventories are proportionate to the need and are within reason.

OUTLINE OF MODERN JORDANIAN ARMY

Since 1973, we and the Jordanians have been working within the framework prepared at that time outlining a modern force for the Jordanian Army. I do not point to the results of that 1973 study as forever unchangeable, but it does provide a series of touchstones against which to measure whether the current sale is within reasonable proportions.

The force structure developed at that time and the evolution of the Jordanian forces since is outlined in the one-page table that I asked Mr. Van Dusen to give to each of you. I think that the easiest thing to do might be to insert that table into the record at this point within my remarks.

Mr. HAMILTON. Without objection, the table will be inserted into the record.

[The table referred to follows:]

Jordan's tank force structure

1973 plan: For comparison:	
U.S. study:	
18 battalions at 54 tanks	972
18 battalions at 44 tanks	792
Jordanian target: 16 battalions at 44 tanks	704
Interim strength: 16 battalions at 35 tanks	560
2 Jordanian decisions 1979–80:	
Return to the originally proposed 18 44-tank battalions.	
Buy 274 British Chieftains.	

Present Jordanian tank fleet:	
308 Centurions, 82 M–60A1's, 283 M–48A1's	673
On order: 274 Chieftains	+274
Tanks on hand plus tanks on order equal 98 more than their desired force level for 18 battalions (849 tanks: 18×44 plus 57 for maintenance and training)	947
In upgrading Centurions, they will retire 15	−15
Total	932
They will dispose of up to 283 outdated M48's	−283
Total	649
Effect of possible U.S. sales:	
If the presently proposed sale of 100 M–60A3's is concluded	+100
This total is 76 more than they have now	749
If we sold another 100	+100
Total	849

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAST YEAR ON JORDANIAN FORCES

Mr. SAUNDERS. Within the past year, as indicated on the table, two Jordanian decisions have been made. There has been a decision to go the full structure recommended in 1973, that is, a structure of 18 battalions, and there has been a decision to purchase a number of British Chieftain tanks. Those are the two major developments since we met here on this subject a year ago.

However, as you will see from the arithmetic in the table, the new purchases, along with the retiring of obsolete tanks, will leave the Jordanian forces still within the structure envisioned in 1973. Let me point out, Mr. Chairman, I don't think it is appropriate to do a numbers game on this or play one number against another number with any precision.

My purpose in putting that range of numbers at the top of the table is simply to provide a series of touchstones. These are the kinds of figures that have been considered over the years. These are the kinds of numbers that represent the actual Jordanian force structure over the years. I thought it would be simply useful for providing a range of, as I say, touchstones against which to measure the sale that we are now considering.

INCREASE IN TANK FORCES IN NATIONS AROUND JORDAN

I would also call your attention to the fact that the tank forces in the nations around Jordan have increased in much-greater proportion over this same period, that is, since 1973. The Arab neighbors' forces individually have more than doubled. Israel's has increased by 50 percent, and in addition to the absolute numbers, the qualitative character of the tank forces surrounding Jordan have improved, for instance, with the introduction of the T–72 tank into Syria.

I think, Mr. Chairman, with those facts introduced, we might as well proceed to your questions if that is satisfactory to you.

[Mr. Saunders' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD H. SAUNDERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TANK SALE TO JORDAN

What I would propose to do this afternoon is to recall briefly my testimony of a year ago when a possible sale of tanks to Jordan was an issue and then to bring you up to date on developments since that time. I then would like to summarize the importance of this sale for U.S. national security interests and for our relations with Jordan.

SITUATION LAST SUMMER

Last summer when I testified on this issue, my starting point was the study the U.S. did in the summer of 1973 to assist Jordan to design a force modernization plan, dropping from five motorized divisions to four, more modern, mechanized and armored divisions. In the context of these four divisions, we discussed a maximum of eighteen armored battalions each with a strength up to 54 tanks, i.e., a structure identical to a U.S. tank battalion. For their own reasons, the Jordanians settled on an eventual structure of 44 tanks per battalion. Implementation of the plan was slowed by funding constraints, and the Jordanians limited themselves to 16 battalions--rather than 18--with 35 tanks per battalion--instead of even 44--in the interim.

The Jordanian tank fleet consists of a large number of aging tanks, including U.S. M48A1s and British Centurions. These are tanks of Korean-War vintage and, after periods of service as long as 20 years, the Jordanians wished to replace or upgrade these vehicles. They decided to rebuild the Centurions. The M48s were to have been rebuilt/upgraded in an Iranian facility at Iranian expense, and we had concurred in this plan in 1976. This would have made the M48 a close match for the M60s now being offered. The collapse of the Iranian government foreclosed this option.

Before the Iranian collapse, the Jordanians had also begun to consider alternative options for completing their tank modernization program: rebuild in Jordan, or new U.S. tanks and/or foreign-source tanks. They engaged in an extended cost and effectiveness study. As an input into the study, the U.S. was asked whether it would supply up to 300 new M60A3 tanks. We agreed to consult with the Congress on that proposal, subject to the provision that the older M48 tanks in the Jordanian inventory be retired on an essentially one-for-one basis. The Jordanians at the same time explored a mix of U.S. and foreign-source procurement.

This was the situation when we discussed the subject of tanks a year ago with the Congress. At that time, we briefed on the then current Jordanian plans to finish equipping the existing 16 battalions, i.e., to raise the strength of each

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battalion from 35 to 44 tanks in the process of modernizing the inventory. We also said that we were not prepared to sell the tank thermal sight at that time.

PRESENT SITUATION

What has changed since last summer? The Jordanians have made two decisions. One was to buy 274 British Chieftain tanks. The other was to return to the 18-battalion structure originally proposed in our 1973 discussions. They will mechanize their last two infantry brigades, which would require the armoring of two battalions. The four division structure remains unchanged. The Jordanians still intend to dispose of the aging M48s.

At the April 1980 meeting of the U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military Commission we informed Jordan that we were prepared to sell 100 M60A3s subject to Congressional concurrence and to consult with the Congress about the sale of an additional 100 tanks. We also agreed to offer the tank thermal sight, which ,since our negative decision about Jordan's request a year ago, has been released to Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Korea. At that meeting, Jordan repeated an earlier request for U.S. assistance in finding purchasers for the M48 tanks and reiterated their intent to remove these tanks from their inventory. In May the Jordanians requested 200 M60A3s to complete their force modernization plans.

U.S. INTERESTS

With this factual background, I would now like to turn to the significant policy issues underlying this decision. These seem to me to be three: How are U.S. interests served by this sale? What will be the effect of the sale on the regional military balance? What would be the effect on our interests of a refusal to make the sale?

We believe this sale is fully consistent with America's interests in the region. U.S. cooperation with moderate regimes in preserving the integrity and security of their own nations is an important part of the role the U.S. is expected by its friends to play. A strong American position of this kind in the area serves the interests of all who depend on us for their ultimate security.

Jordan has a long-standing policy of denying Jordanian territory to potential terrorists. Maintenance of this policy, among other sensible Jordanian policies, is reinforced by U.S. cooperation and understanding for Jordan's legitimate defensive needs and goals.

Jordan works actively for the stability and security of the states of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. This Jordanian policy conforms to our own interests in the region's stability and in promoting a policy of regional

cohesiveness in resisting outside aggression. In 1961, Jordan sent troops to Kuwait to ward off a threatened Iraqi invasion. Jordan cooperated in the defense of Oman against the 1965-1975 communist-supported rebellion in Oman. Over a thousand Jordanian military advisors are actively serving in the Peninsula states, and more than ten thousand military personnel from this area have been trained in Jordanian facilities. During his recent visit to Washington, King Hussein reaffirmed his willingness to respond, if called on for help by the Peninsula states. The effectiveness of Jordan's assistance, which closely supports our interests, is directly related to both Jordan's own military strength and the close military relationship which Jordan is perceived as having with the U.S.

We disagree with Jordan about the merits of the Camp David process. The recent meetings between the President and King Hussein, however, reaffirmed the fact that Jordan supports Resolution 242 and wants a comprehensive peace with Israel. Jordan's attitude will be critically important to bringing about a West Bank settlement which we would find acceptable. As we work toward the goal of a comprehensive peace, it is essential that we preserve and protect our relations of trust and cooperation with Jordan--something

which we will have greater difficulty doing if we do not continue our longstanding cooperation with them in maintaining their legitimate defensive strength.

We have examined carefully the question of the military balance, both between Jordan and Israel and in the broader regional context. Let me briefly take you through the numbers:

-- The present Jordanian tank force numbers 673 tanks, including 283 M48 tanks, 308 British Centurions, and 82 M60A1s.

-- The Jordanians have on order 274 British Chieftains. If the Chieftains were added to the existing inventory, the total would be 947 tanks, i.e., more than the Jordanians want.

-- They are, however, planning to dispose of the M48s.

-- If they add the 100 tanks which you are considering today and dispose of the M48s, they will have an inventory of 749 tanks, consisting of 293 upgraded Centurions (15 Centurion tanks will be used in the upgrading process), 274 Chieftains, 82 M60A1s, and

100 M60A3s. That is 76 more tanks than they have right now and fewer than they actually have on hand and on order combined. It is also fewer than the 972 envisioned in the 1973 study.

-- If we go forward with the sale of the second 100 tanks, a decision which is still under review, the total impact of both sales would be 150 more tanks than Jordan presently has on the ground. This is not, nor can it be, a significant threat to Israel; it is nonetheless a substantial contribution to Jordan's defense capability and to regional stability.

Iraq and Syria have both qualitatively and quantitatively increased their tank forces. In fact, this has been a primary reason for Jordan's continued modernization. Furthermore, even when Jordan's tank forces are added to those of other Arab countries, one must realize that Israel has also expanded and modernized its tank forces since 1973 and continues to enjoy an overwhelming superiority against all likely adversaries. Equally important is our judgment that Jordan has no offensive intentions, that it is a small country outnumbered by all its major neighbors, and that its forces modernization plan, long under way, is both prudent and reasonable.

In considering this sale, you must also contemplate the effects of our refusal or your rejection. In that context, it should be remembered that the British Chieftain tank, purchased by Jordan last year and which Jordan could again purchase, is at least a comparable vehicle to the M60A3 and has features, such as gun size and engine power, superior to the M60A3. The policy question we have to address is not whether Jordan will obtain more modern tanks, but who will supply them and under what conditions. Consider the following:

-- A U.S. sale to Jordan bolsters a key bilateral relationship and carries with it restraints (on transfer to third countries, for example), while acquisition of tanks from another country would carry few or no restraints.

-- In the context of the M60 sale, Jordan has agreed to replace its M48s on a one-for-one basis and intends, in fact, to phase out virtually all its M48s. Working with the Jordanians we have already identified three friendly countries whose combined requests for tanks exceed Jordan's M48 inventory. Serveral other purchasers are also possible.

An effort to "punish" Jordan by withholding our consent to this sale will not prevent the acquisition of tanks, but it will do serious damage to a key bilateral relationship and to our efforts to work with Jordan for regional security and stability.

In summary, the sale is a clear demonstration that we are capable of recognizing and supporting our interests in the stability and security of the region as a whole and supporting these interests. Jordan performs a critically important security role in cooperation with key states of the Persian Gulf region, thus serving U.S. interests directly and indirectly. The U.S. must maintain a close working relationship with Jordan in the present and future interest of peace. This can only be done if we are prepared to respond in a reasonable way to reasonable Jordanian requests for cooperation in areas vital to Jordan's own security.

We have not provided all that Jordan has requested; however, close Jordanian-U.S. working relationships have reinforced the inclination of the Jordanian armed forces to look to the West, and the U.S. particularly, for advice, training and military orientation. For the U.S. to turn away from this relationship would clearly diminish our capacity to influence Jordan's future policies, political and military, and to serve our broad, enduring national interests in an important region of the world.

DELIVERY DATES OF THE 100 TANKS

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Can you give us the delivery dates on the 100 tanks first?

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. ERNEST GRAVES, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

General GRAVES. Well, sir, assuming that the sale proceeds and that Jordan signs the letter of offer promptly, the tanks would go under contract in early October, and delivery would be 24 months later.

Mr. HAMILTON. So they would not get any of these 100 tanks for at least 2 years.

General GRAVES. That is right, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is this the best tank in our inventory?

General GRAVES. Well, it is the best tank short of the XM–1, which will be coming off the line shortly. The first series production tank came off the XM–1 line last spring, but other than that, this would be the best.

TANK THERMAL SITE

Mr. HAMILTON. When we discussed the configuration of the M–60A3 last year, we were not going to include the tank thermal sight. What do you call that, TTS? Is that it?

General GRAVES. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. These tanks will include that, is that correct?

General GRAVES. That is correct.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, why that change?

General GRAVES. What we have now is a situation where the tank thermal site is being provided to Israel. It will be provided to Saudi Arabia. It will be provided to Egypt. This has been added since we came last year, last year when we came up here we did not feel we wanted Jordan to be one of the first countries in the region to receive the tank thermal site. It is now our judgment, based not only on that but on some information we have about the other countries' tanks in the region, that by the time Jordan receives these tanks, it will be nearer to one of the last countries to receive a passive night capability of this type, and, therefore, will not be involved in giving Jordan technology which its neighbors don't have.

Mr. HAMILTON. Describe for us what this new capability is.

General GRAVES. It is a passive infrared device which allows the tank commander or the tank gunner to lay the gun at night without any active radiation that would make the tank more easily detectable than its engine exhaust. In other words, it is a low-level infrared device which allows the tank crew to see in the dark.

PRESENT JORDANIAN TANK INVENTORY

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Now I want to get the numbers straight. I know it can get a little complicated, and I don't want to add confusion with too many numbers, but what is the current inventory of Jordan's tanks today?

Mr. SAUNDERS. If you start with the third heading on the table there, it gives the present Jordanian tank fleet, and just work the arithmetic down through those numbers, Mr. Chairman——

Mr. HAMILTON. So we end up with how many tanks, 649? Is that what you were talking about?

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General GRAVES. The present inventory on the ground is 673. There is an order of 274 Chieftains from Great Britain, which would raise that to 947.

Mr. HAMILTON. When will the Chieftains be delivered to Jordan?

General GRAVES. The deliveries, I believe, begin in about a year.

Mr. HAMILTON. The Chieftain is a British tank?

General GRAVES. That is a British tank comparable, although you could get into detailed arguments, but comparable to the M–60. It has a bigger gun than the M–60 and a more powerful engine. It has the 120-millimeter gun.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, when are they going to dispose of these 283 outdated M-48's?

General GRAVES. That is really related to the sale that we are discussing here today, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Will the 100 tanks that we are discussing today replace the 283 M-48's?

General GRAVES. They talked about a one-for-one replacement, building toward their ultimate goal, which is shown at the bottom of the page, namely, 849. They would be willing, I think, to exchange the M–48's essentially one for one on the first 100, but they are going all the way down. Disposing of all of them probably would be a phased proposition over the delivery period, both of the Chieftains and the M-60's. Furthermore——

Mr. HAMILTON. Excuse me, General. Is that disposal going to be a part of our letter of offer? Is that going to be written into it, or is it going to be a side understanding?

General GRAVES. I don't think we intend to put this in the letter of offer. It would be in a side understanding, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAUNDERS. We already have a letter from the Jordanians that indicates this is their proposal.

ADDITIONAL TANKS

Mr. HAMILTON. All right. What is our obligation on the second 100? You were here a year ago talking about 300. Today you are here talking about 100. There is another 100 coming along, apparently. What is the status of that second 100?

Mr. SAUNDERS. First of all, let's put these 300 we were talking about last year behind us. As you remember, we came up at a time when the Jordanians were considering a number of options, and what we were seeking then is an agreement that the possibility of selling up to 300. In other words, depending on what they bought elsewhere and what else they acquired, there would be some number in that range.

That thinking process I think we have put behind us. They have now bought the Chieftains. They have the set of numbers that you have before you. They have asked us for 200, and we have told them that we are prepared to go to the Congress with the proposal to sell 100 now, and that is the proposal we have before us. We have said we would consult informally with Members of Congress about the second 100. But there is no specific arrangement to come forward with that proposal at this time.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Rosenthal.

U.S. TANK MANUFACTURING CAPACITY

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What is the U.S. tank manufacturing resources or capacity? In other words, how many can we manufacture a year of the ones that are on line now?

General GRAVES. The line at the present time is operating at 40 tanks a month, or 480 a year. This is down from recent production level of 80 a month, or 960 a year. It has gone down because basically we are at the end of deliveries to U.S. forces, and the only customers we have after a few more tanks are delivered to the U.S. Army will be foreign military sales customers. All the rest of our U.S. appropriations for tanks are going into the buildup of XM–1 production.

TANK DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR EGYPT

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The sale that was made to Egypt—are those tanks taken out of U.S. inventory?

General GRAVES. What happened with respect to Egypt was as follows. When we discussed the beginning of the modernization with Egypt, Egypt was anxious to have early delivery of a limited number of tanks to begin training on this U.S. equipment. What we agreed was that we would deliver the first 20 tanks this coming December, and then we would deliver 11 a quarter, which makes a total of 64 tanks by the end of 1981.

That is essentially the tanks for 1 battalion, 1 battalion plus an additional 10 or so for the maintenance float and training. This will be largely for the Egyptian Army to train one battalion and become accustomed to this tank. They will be diverted from production which was initiated by the U.S. Army.

TANK INVENTORY FOR U.S. FORCES

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The number of tanks alloted U.S. forces in Central Europe: Are they equal to our requirements? Are they up to the numerical assignment?

General GRAVES. As far as U.S. tank inventory is concerned, the U.S. Army has not received all the tanks that it needs for both its tables of organization and equipment and war reserve. This is a function of U.S. appropriations.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Aside from the appropriation going to the table of organization, what is the shortage and discrepancy in what they have and what they should be allotted?

General GRAVES. I can give you the approximate numbers. The authorized acquisition objectives for the U.S. Army is somewhat in excess of 15,000 tanks. A level below that which would be called a prudent level is somewhat more than 12,000 tanks.

At present we are at a level somewhat more than 11,000 tanks. A major factor here is in the transition from production of M–60 tanks to XM–1 tanks.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. As to the XM–1, they are not on the line yet, are they?

General GRAVES. The first series production tank has come off the line, but they are not coming off in quantity yet.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How many are coming off?

General GRAVES. I believe it will reach 30 a month by 1982.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Will the sale or delivery of these tanks to Jordan impede in any way U.S. national security interests in other areas of the world?

General GRAVES. No, sir, because these tanks represent deliveries from M–60 production. The U.S. Army and the Defense Department at one point considered a further year of M–60 production for the U.S. Army. However, a decision was made that the money go instead into XM–1 production, not M–60 production. So the U.S. Army production is ending.

XM–1

Mr. ROSENTHAL. There are still a lot of wrinkles to be ironed out in the XM–1.

General GRAVES. No; I don't think that is the Army's position. The Army's position is that they have solved the engine problems.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What is the Defense Department's position?

General GRAVES. That is the Defense Department's position.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Are they synonymous, the Army position and the Defense Department position?

General GRAVES. Yes, sir, they are.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Are you sure about that?

General GRAVES. I am sure about that. I am not the expert witness on that. We could provide you testimony from the people with the results of the Army test. Secretary Brown testified when he came before Congress for this year's budget.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. These are manufactured by whom?

General GRAVES. They are manufactured at the Detroit Tank Arsenal, which is a government-owned plant operated by the Chrysler Corp.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. And in the event that Chrysler had any further financial difficulties, is there some residual arrangement to keep that facility going?

General GRAVES. My understanding is that the contract is written in such a way that it is substantially insulated from private production problems.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. In what way?

General GRAVES. It is a cost-reimbursable-type contract. It is a separate contract. Nothing in the plant is owned by Chrysler. Everything in the plant, including the stock, is owned by the Government.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. If Chrysler ceased for any reason, which I am not suggesting, to do business, who would be the management or agent for that facility?

General GRAVES. That would have to be decided at the time, but it could be met by another firm. It could be taken over by the Government. People would still be in the plant.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You don't see any risks in that situation at all?

General Graves. Well, minimal risks. I think a very careful decision has been made with respect to Chrysler's production of the M–60 and also of the XM–1.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Who is making the XM–1?
General GRAVES. Chrysler.

KING HUSSEIN'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Saunders, let me just go to subsequent questions as time permits. Is it the view of the administration that King Hussein is holding to a moderate course in the Middle East, or is it conceivable that by the refusal to join or encourage the Camp David process, he is drifting into the orbit of the rejectionists, Syria, Iraq and the PLO?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I don't think he is drifting into the orbit of the rejectionists. I think he remains quite firmly committed, as I said in my opening remarks, to making peace with Israel within the context of Resolution 242. He disagrees with us that Camp David provides a framework that goes far enough to meet the needs of the Palestinians and the West Bank and Gaza, but he certainly has never wavered from his commitment to make peace.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. But how does he show that?

Mr. SAUNDERS. That he is prepared to join a negotiating process if he felt that it were leading in a direction that he could support.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Given the difficulty some of us have with this sale, here is a country who for its own national interest and, presumably, for its own national concerns decides not to join the peace process that is presently in momentum—or presently stalemated, depending upon where you are sitting—and yet we are trying to further enhance his military capability.

ROLE AND STATUS OF JORDAN

Mr. SAUNDERS. I think, Mr. Rosenthal, the basic point here is what kind of Jordan does one want, and whether that kind of Jordan is one that could join the peace process at a time when it feels that its ends can be achieved. I think the kind of Jordan that we do want is one that is stable, that is able to preserve its own security in the face of threats, is able to preserve Israel's longest border.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. They protect the stability of Israel's border?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I think the fact that Jordan does not allow terrorist attacks from its own territory in any direction is a critical factor in maintaining the stability.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Jordan was aggressive in 1967 in crossing that border.

Mr. SAUNDERS. It depends on which border you are talking about, Mr. Rosenthal. The West Bank was governed by Jordan at that time, and yes, they did station forces in their own territory east of the Jordan River.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. They proceeded with others in 1967, didn't they?

Mr. SAUNDERS. No; they did not. They didn't cross the border. They opened fire on Israeli forces and they got drawn into the war. The West Bank was occupied by Israel.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Maybe I am not articulating the way I would like to. It seems that we are rewarding Jordan, whose reluctance or intransigence is not enhancing the peace process. How do we show to

the rest of the world our unhappiness with Jordan not participating in the peace process?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I don't think that is the question before us. I think the issue is what kind of Jordan do you want there? What kind of Jordan do you want there, and is Jordan prepared to make peace with Israel? And the answer to that question is, quite clearly, yes. A stable Jordan is extremely important to the stability of that part of the world, and it is extremely important to preserving a platform from which one could launch into later peace negotiations.

I don't think that preserving the security and stability of the country over a longer period of time is something that you hinge on rewards over tactical positions one way or the other.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. There is no problem with their stability because they have the option of buying tanks if that is their choice.

Mr. SAUNDERS. What they have done is chosen to relate to us as the leader of the free world, as their principal supplier of military equipment. It seems to me it is extremely important to the United States of America to be seen as a reliable partner.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Isn't the converse true, that the other side should be seen as a dependable partner? Let me just say where I think the great fallacy or weakness in the thrust of your presentation is. On page 4 you raise three questions. How are U.S. interests served by the sale? What will be the effect of the sale on the regional military balance? What will be the effect on our interests of a refusal to make the sale? You never raised the question of how you see this as it contributes or detracts from the peace process.

Mr. SAUNDERS. I would say that is basically in answer to the first question, how does it contribute to U.S. interests in the area? Are U.S. interests in the area focused in a central way on achieving an Arab-Israeli settlement? It seems to me that preserving a stable Jordan is absolutely critical to preserving a platform in that position, bordering, as it does, on areas where a Palestinian solution would be worked out. It is absolutely critical to efforts to achieve peace.

Now, King Hussein as much as any Arab leader in the area has made it clear that he is prepared to make peace with Israel. He happens to disagree with us today over the tactics of the negotiations, but he has committed himself to peace far before any other Arab leader in the area.

KING HUSSEIN'S OBJECTIVES

Mr. ROSENTHAL. He wants to bring the Russians into the peace process, doesn't he?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I am not aware of that.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. That is what he told us.

Mr. SAUNDERS. I have not seen any energetic activity to bring the Russians in.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. He wants to reconvene the Geneva Conference and bring in the Russians as coconvenors of the process. That is what he told us. Do you think that provides the stability?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I don't think that that is his only objective. I think what he has said is his objective is to find a peace process which goes far enough in the direction of resolving the problems that are important to Jordan and to the Palestinians. He has on occasion

said that perhaps reconvening the Geneva Conference would provide the alternative forum that he believes is necessary.

He has also talked about a variety of other avenues; namely, going to the United Nations or other things, but he has never precisely defined the alternative forum.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. In your opinion, does he have any realistic proposals for moving the peace process along?

Mr. SAUNDERS. He has never described a precise course of action that could complement or substitute for the Camp David process.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. In the meantime, we should permit him to become a formidable military force.

Mr. SAUNDERS. I wouldn't phrase it that way. If you looked at this in a decade's perspective, which is what we are doing, over a 10-year period, to develop a force that is evolving, modernizing in the same way as other forces in the area, and staying within a structure which was envisioned in 1973, I can't see that as making him a formidable military force in a way that was not envisioned previously.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Winn.

EXTERNAL THREATS TO JORDAN

Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Either one of you can answer this. I guess Mr. Saunders would be the better one. What external threats are these tanks designed to protect Jordan against?

Mr. SAUNDERS. No; we did not talk about that precisely. One of the last times Jordan confronted an external threat was in the course of the Syrian invasion in 1970. That is one potential answer. At that time, we were concerned about the movement of Iraqi forces. That is another potential threat.

Of course, Jordan has to think about the third possibility, which is another war in which it would be engaged with Israel.

REGIONAL MILITARY BALANCE

Mr. WINN. You don't think that the addition of the U.S. M–60A3 tanks and the British Chieftain tanks for Jordan's force structure will alter the regional military balance in any way?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I would say that the alterations have come from the fact that the Syrian tank inventory has doubled since 1973, the Iraqi tank inventory has doubled since 1973, Israel's is 50 percent greater. All of them have engaged in qualitative upgrading. What we are talking about here is a modest and proportionate continuing process of modernizing the Jordanian Armed Forces, which I think in terms of modernization would have an inventory not a great deal larger than it did in 1973, a 25-percent increase or something like that.

Mr. WINN. It may have been presented to this committee but I don't remember any information telling us that the Syrians and the Iraqi's have increased the size of their tank forces.

Mr. SAUNDERS. We, on occasion, I think, previously have provided on a classified basis a list of the inventories and major items of equipment for all of the countries in that area. If that is not readily available, we could provide it again.

SAFEGUARDING OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Mr. WINN. Staff says it was.

General Graves, you testified that the risk of the M-60A3 sensitive technology falling into unfriendly hands was acceptable.

General GRAVES. Yes, sir. I believe that is true. We certainly have great confidence in the security system within Jordan. Our long experience has been that they do a good job of safeguarding things in that country.

Mr. WINN. Is that still true now with the inclusion of the tank night thermal sight, which was not on the equipment list here?

General GRAVES. We feel, strictly from a security standpoint, that it is entirely acceptable for Jordan to receive this sight. As I was saying earlier, other countries in the area will have it. Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt will all have this same thing.

Mr. WINN. Was the laser rangefinder on their list here?

General GRAVES. Yes. That is part of the fire control system for the gun, and that was included last year.

Mr WINN. And the solid state computer?

General GRAVES. Yes, sir.

FINANCING OF TANKS

Mr. WINN. How is Jordan going to pay for this purchase? Are they going to try to make use of the FMS financing program?

General GRAVES. They may use some of the financing, although financing is not adequate to pay for the entire buy, so they will have other sources.

Mr. WINN. Do we have any say-so on how they pay for it? Do we consult with them?

General GRAVES. We have a say-so in that the citing of credits from us is normally with our concurrence. As a practical matter, since Jordan's purchases from us in recent years have exceeded the levels of credit we provided, we have tried to help Jordan manage its whole program so that they could buy what they needed, and we worked with them in adjusting the parts of those sales for which they used cash and those for which they used credits.

Mr. WINN. Was the financing discussed at the April 1980 meeting of the United States-Jordanian Joint Military Commission?

General GRAVES It was discussed to the extent that we asked them their intention about whether they intended to use credits or cash. They had a number of other ongoing purchases, including artillery, which have already been reviewed by the committee. They had not made a final decision as to how they would mix these together.

DISCUSSIONS WITH JORDAN ON TANK SALES

Mr. WINN The commitment on the tank sales was made at that meeting?

General GRAVES. We did indicate our intention to bring forward the first 100 tanks for congressional consideration at that meeting.

Mr. WINN. Were more than 100 tanks discussed at that meeting?

General GRAVES. No, sir. We said that we would bring forward the first 100 for congressional consideration, and that we would consult with them on the second 100.

Mr. WINN. I was going to say, because my information tells me that in May of this year, Jordan requested 200.

General GRAVES. Yes; but that includes the two increments. In other words, that includes——

Mr. WINN. The 100 that you discussed in April?

General GRAVES. The Jordanians discussed in April a requirement for a total of 200. With respect to those 200, we said that we were prepared to bring forward for your consideration the first 100, but that on the second 100, we would only go so far as to consult informally with Congress on those. If there were a decision to deliver those, we would consult with Congress again, later.

Then, in order to close the loop on this, Jordan reaffirmed its request for 200 following the meeting.

DISCUSSIONS WITH CONGRESS ON ADDITIONAL TANKS

Mr. WINN. General, how do you discuss informally with Congress the second phase, the second 100 tanks? How is that process?

General GRAVES. I think that the representatives of State and Defense will sit down with individual Members and explain the justification for this and receive the reaction of Members.

Mr. WINN. Do you do it with Members or with staff? Nobody has ever asked me.

General GRAVES. We would be glad to meet with you, sir.

Mr. WINN. To the best of my recollection I don't think anybody has ever come and visited with me about it.

General GRAVES. We would be glad to do that.

Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Pease.

Mr. PEASE. Yes; Mr. Chairman. Just a moment please.

Mr. HAMILTON. Without objection, a statement of Representative William M. Brodhead of Michigan on the proposed sale of tanks to Jordan will be entered into the record at the conclusion of the hearing.

Mr. Pease.

TANK PRODUCTION CAPACITY

Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A series of questions.

General Graves, you mentioned our tank production capacity is now 480 per year. Is that right?

General GRAVES. That is the rate at which the line is operating.

Mr. PEASE. Does that include XM–1 tanks?

General GRAVES. No; that is the M–60.

Mr. PEASE. And the production of the M–60 line for U.S. Army purposes is almost complete; is that correct?

General GRAVES. That is correct, sir. It will be ended next year.

Mr. PEASE. I thought you said that the delivery of 11 tanks per quarter to Egypt in 1981 will be diverted from production that would normally go to the U.S. Army. Is that right?

General GRAVES. That is right. That is at the very tail end of the U.S. Army production.

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Mr. PEASE. So our present production line will be producing for the U.S. Army——

General GRAVES. Through 1981. And then we go into production for foreign customers.

JORDANIAN OPTIONS IF TANK SALE DISAPPROVED

Mr. PEASE. I see. What would Jordan's options be if we were not to approve this sale?

General GRAVES. I think the most obvious one would be additional Chieftain tanks from Great Britain.

Mr. PEASE. In terms of our analysis, would that be an unsatisfactory result for Jordan? Would their security be any less?

General GRAVES. There are two things. They have a certain number of M–60 tanks now, so they would like to standardize on three tanks: The Centurion, which is an older British tank which is now being rebuilt; the Chieftain, which is a newer British tank on which they will receive deliveries later; and then our M–60. I think there is an advantage to them militarily to standardize this way. I think the contacts that they maintain, both with the British and ourselves through having our equipment are valuable to them in terms of their military strength.

Mr. SAUNDERS. I think there is one additional factor related to that question. It is only the United States that has the agreement with them to retire the M–48 tanks. So I think in terms of staying within the divisional force structure, it is the U.S. sale that carries with it the arithmetic that is on this sheet.

Mr. PEASE. And that commitment is firm as far as the United States is concerned?

Mr. SAUNDERS. Yes.

DOMESTIC ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Mr. PEASE. Fine. Was our decision to try to sell tanks to Jordan influenced at all by the job-producing aspect of it as far as American workers is concerned? Does that enter into it at all?

Mr. SAUNDERS. Speaking of it from the State Department's view, our role in this has largely been through the discussions with the Jordanians. I am not sure what influence that has on the people in the Pentagon who are in charge of manufacturing tanks, but our dialog with the Jordanians has not included that point.

General GRAVES. I don't think that maintaining a warm M–60 line would ever drive a sale decision. It would certainly be accurate to say that it is to our advantage to have a warm M–60 line, that is, to be in a posture to supply friendly countries such as Israel. Suppose Israel wants to make another M–60 buy later downstream, which would be consistent with the fact that they have a large number of M–60 tanks. If there is a warm line, that will come naturally. If there is a cold line, there will be a substantial premium that will have to be paid to restart the line. Israel, of course, is not the only potential customer for M–60 tanks. So from a security assistance point of view—which is my job—I would have to admit that a succession of sales spread over time is advantageous, assuming that we are interested in collective security and being in a position to supply friendly countries with weapons.

We won't be in a position, in my opinion, to start supplying the XM–1 to friendly countries for some time. The priority is for our own forces.

Mr. PEASE. I gather from what you say that the plain consideration of employment for Americans producing M–60's as opposed to Britain's producing Chieftains was not a part of the equation.

General GRAVES. No, sir. I think that we are glad to see people employed in our mobilization base here, but I don't think you will find us saying let's sell more arms to raise U.S. employment. That is not the administration's policy.

REACTION OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO THE SALE

Mr. PEASE. Thank you.

Mr. Saunders, have we received any official objection from the Israeli Government to this sale?

Mr. SAUNDERS. The Israelis have expressed their concern about the sale of tanks to Jordan. We have had a series of conversations with the Israelis over the years about the dilemma that they face. I think that members of the Israeli Government on previous occasions have said, either informally to members of this committee, that if Jordan is to be supplied militarily, then it is better that the military supply relationship be with a country like the United States than with the Soviet Union, for instance.

On the other hand, the Israelis have a natural desire not to see too large an inventory of weapons of any kind on their borders. It is my view, and this has been my response to those Israelis with whom I have discussed this subject, that our approach to military supply in Jordan has been one of moderation.

As I have indicated here, we have made out a program in 1973, 7 years ago, which described a balanced, modest Jordanian military force, including tanks. We are still operating generally within that structure, and it seems to me we all have to accept the fact that military forces will be modernized as time goes on. The pace of modernization and the increase of absolute numbers has been much greater in Israel than it has been in Jordan, for instance.

Although we would prefer that there would not be progression in the number of weapons in an area like this, this represents a modest approach to the Jordanians' problem, and, of course, the Israelis do have a serious interest in their being a stable country on that long border of theirs.

Mr. PEASE. Clearly, the Israelis would be concerned about the sales of any kind of arms to any of their Arab neighbors, as I would be if I were Israel. I guess my question is, has the Israeli Government said that we are concerned but we think the sale is OK, or we are concerned and we think you ought not to make the sale? Have we received any indication, officially or unofficially, of a conclusion on the part of the Israelis as to where their concern leads them?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I don't want to be speaking here for the Israeli Government, because we will get some kind of protest tomorrow that I misrepresented their position. But I think it is fair to say that they have expressed their concern. We would not expect them to endorse a sale of this kind. In our presentations, as I have said, we have explained

that our sale is within the framework which is well known to everyone, and it is, I think, a modest sale.

As I said in my opening statement, whereas Israel would obviously prefer to have no additions to any Arab arms inventory on its borders and that wish is certainly understandable, I think in the real world that is not the issue. The issue in my mind is whether the increases that will inevitably take place, take place within the framework of proportionate responses to a need, and it seems to me that both the Jordanian Government and our military supply programing has been within that kind of framework.

Mr. PEASE. We have received, then, no official request from the Israeli Government that we not consummate this sale; is that correct?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I don't know what to describe as official. We have had approaches by Israeli representatives saying that they are concerned about this sale, with the implication that they would prefer that it not take place. I don't know whether that is an official notice.

Mr. PEASE. Would this committee be within its bounds to proceed in the absence of an official protest from the Israeli Government, or would it be unreasonable to expect under the circumstances that the Israeli Government would protest it officially even if it preferred not to have the sale?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I am on strange ground here speaking for the Israeli Government. I don't know what they are going to do.

Mr. PEASE. I am not asking you to do that.

Mr. SAUNDERS. I have explained to you what I think the Israeli position to be. I think that is an accurate statement of their position. I don't know whether they intend to protest or not. I think they have stated their views and they have asked us to take them into consideration. We certainly have done that, as we always have.

JORDAN'S LACK OF PARTICIPATION IN CAMP DAVID PROCESS

Mr. PEASE. Let me turn to another question, Mr. Chairman. Then I will be finished.

I think a dilemma for a number of members of this subcommittee is the Camp David process and the fact that Jordan did not join the Camp David process. Some people have said that it would be unrealistic to expect Jordan to join the Camp David process in view of the objection to it by other Arab nations and in view of Jordan's somewhat precarious position among its own Arab neighbors.

What is our position or your position, either one, as to whether it would have been reasonable on our part to expect Jordan to join in? Do I make myself clear?

Mr. SAUNDERS. Yes. We certainly hoped when we were at Camp David that the Jordanians might join in. Obviously, we wrote a role into the Camp David process for Jordan with the thought that that was not an unrealistic thing to do. However, we did recognize that it was a presumptuous thing to do.

I remember one late night conversation we had there in which we discussed whether or not it was appropriate to write a role into a process for a nation that wasn't present and which we had not, at that point, had a chance to consult. We decided in the end that it would not be realistic to talk about dealing with the West Bank problem without thinking through in some way how Jordan might fit

into the process, and we decided that we would write a conditional role in for Jordan into Camp David.

Therefore, we said Jordan would be invited to join. If Jordan joined, it would play the following role, and so on. So we had hopes that the Jordanians would join, but we could not be sure of that. It was only after the Jordanians had a chance to assess the Camp David Accords, their public presentation by the parties at Camp David, the other Arab reaction, that we knew exactly the position that they would take.

I think it is important, Mr. Pease, though, while acknowledging exactly what the facts are with regard to Jordan's role in the Camp David process, to bear in mind that Jordan remains committed to a peace process within the frame of Resolution 242. Its disagreement with the Camp David process is that it feels that that process does not go far enough. It is not a disagreement with the objectives of Camp David, which is a peace solution based on Resolution 242.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Bingham.

JORDAN'S POSITION ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, just following up on what Mr. Pease said, it surely is true, is it not, that we have been disappointed with Jordan's response to the Camp David effort and the Camp David Accords?

Mr. SAUNDERS. Yes, there is no question about that. The President and King Hussein, during the recent visit of King Hussein here, exchanged candid assessments of what has happened over the months since Camp David, the President expressing our feelings, the disappointment that Jordan had not been able to join, and King Hussein explaining from his perspective what the drawbacks of the process were.

Mr. BINGHAM. In terms of Jordan's commitment to 242, my impression is, and correct me if I am wrong, on several occasions King Hussein has indicated that he would join the negotiations provided Israel would commit itself to virtually total withdrawal of Israel to the 1967 borders with possibly minor adjustments. Is that about right?

Mr. SAUNDERS. King Hussein, as you recall, was here in the United States in New York when Resolution 242 was being negotiated and when the final discussions took place. As you know, there are two different interpretations of Resolution 242. The Jordanian feeling is that 242 called for peace between Israel and its neighbors, and in that context, Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, as it said. In the Jordanian view, that meant most of the territories or the territories with minor boundary rectifications.

In that instance I think King Hussein has indicated his willingness to join the peace negotiations.

Mr. BINGHAM. Right. But hasn't he said he would join them only if Israel accepted that interpretation in advance?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I don't——

Mr. BINGHAM. That is my impression of what he has been saying.

Mr. SAUNDERS. What he has said recently is that he can't join a peace process when the public position of the Israeli Government is, in his view, a contradiction of the understanding of 242 as most people held it in 1967. What he is saying is that in his view, the position of the

current Israeli Government is that the West Bank should become part of Israel, and as long as that is, in his view, the objective of the Irsaeli Government, then he cannot join the negotiation when that is the apparent purpose of the Israeli Government.

That is far from his interpretation of 242.

Mr. BINGHAM. It seems to me on his part today a virtual refusal to negotiate. He doesn't accept the process of the negotiation where it starts with Jordan laying out the position that they understand what 242 means, and Israel laying out the proposition of what their understanding is, and they negotiate something in between.

He is starting out by saying he will negotiate only if it starts with Israel accepting Jordan's interpretation. I don't want to pursue this because I have a couple of others, but that is my perception of his position.

Let me ask you this. This transaction is surely a form of military assistance to Jordan, is it not?

Mr. SAUNDERS. In terms of making our manufacturing capability available, that is certainly true. It is part of the United States-Jordanian military supply program. If there are credits involved, that is a further assistance.

PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION OF JORDAN

Mr. BINGHAM. My recollection here is—and nobody here seems to have the text—but my recollection is that in last year's Foreign Assistance Act, there was a requirement adopted by the Congress, signed by the President, that for Jordan to be eligible for assistance, the President would have to be satisfied or certified—I don't recall the exact wording—that Jordan was in good faith contributing to peace in the Middle East.

Are you acquainted with that? What happens to that? Has there been such a finding? Have we received assurance to that effect? Is that the view of the administration, that Jordan is in good faith contributing to the peace in the Middle East?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I don't know that there has been a formal finding to that effect. I think it is the feeling that the King, in preserving stability in his country and restating his readiness to join the peace process at an appropriate moment, is a willing partner to a reasonable effort to achieve peace. I don't think there is any question about that in our minds. He happens to disagree with us on the way we are going about it at present, but he has never said that he is unwilling to make peace with Israel or that he would not join a peace process that had the prospect of achieving peace.

Indeed, as I said earlier, he perhaps committed himself to that proposition before any other Arab leader on the scene today.

Mr. BINGHAM. It seems to me that this committee and the House is entitled to a formal statement of the administration's position on this issue as to how this sale, which is military assistance, is to be brought into compliance with the requirements of the 1979 act.

Mr. SAUNDERS. My colleague tells me that a finding by the President has been made to that effect. We will provide a copy of that for the committee.

Mr. HAMILTON. Without objection, it will be made part of the committee record.

[The document referred to follows:]

Statement of Reasons for Determination
Under the International Security Assistance Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-92)
Relating to Security Assistance for
Jordan

Section 25 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-92) prohibits the use of funds authorized to be appropriated in the fiscal year 1980 for military assistance and international military education and training under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for foreign military sales financing under the Arms Export Control Act for Jordan, unless the President determines and reports to the Congress that "Jordan is acting in good faith to achieve further progress toward a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East and that the expenditure of such funds will serve the process of peace in the Middle East."

During the early period of this administration, Jordan cooperated in our efforts to reconvene the Geneva Middle East peace conference. Jordan continues to contribute to area stability by effective action against terrorists' attempts to attack Israel from Jordan. Jordan has not accepted the Camp David Accords. It differs with us on the likelihood that these Accords can lead to a broadly acceptable final settlement. This is a deep, but essentially tactical difference and has not changed Jordan's adherence to the fundamental goal of peace in accordance with UN Resolution 242.

The most recent, public and authoritative statement of Jordan's policy was given by King Hussein in his speech to the United Nations on September 25, 1979. He said that Jordan "would continue to stand for a just, honorable, viable and durable peace." This accords with private assurances received from King Hussein and is accepted as an accurate characterization of Jordan's policy. Jordan's cooperation remains essential to a stable West Bank settlement. Our military assistance relationship is a vital element in this cooperation and in Jordan's ability to follow a political course independent of pressure. It is important that we continue to work with Jordan, as a friendly Arab state, in the search for a just and compresensive final peace.

Therefore, I have determined that Jordan is acting in good faith to achieve further progress toward a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East and that the expenditure of funds for security assistance to Jordan in FY 1980 will serve the purpose of peace in the Middle East.

PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION ON JORDAN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 20, 1979

Presidential Determination
No. 80-9

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Determination under Section 25 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1979 -- Assistance for Jordan.

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 25 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1979, I hereby determine that Jordan is acting in good faith to achieve further progress toward a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, and that the expenditure of funds appropriated or otherwise available to carry out chapters 2 and 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act, for Jordan in the fiscal year 1980 will serve the process of peace in the Middle East.

You are requested to report this determination to the Congress on my behalf, as required by law.

This determination shall be published in the Federal Register.

Jimmy Carter

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN M–60A3, M–60A1, AND M–48A1

Mr. BINGHAM. General, could you tell us in lay terms, if you can, a little bit about the differences between the M–60A1's, which Jordan has 82 of, as I understand it, and the M–48A1's, which they have 283 of, according to our figures, on the one hand, and the M–60A3 on the other?

General GRAVES. The M–48A1, the first tank, which is the earlier tank, has a gasoline engine, a 90-millimeter gun, and does not have a night capability. The basic laying of the gun is an electromechanic system. When we move to the M–60A1, we are up to a 105-millimeter gun and a diesel engine. The laying of the gun is somewhat more advanced, but not as advanced as the M–60A3.

The difference between the M–60A1 and the M–60A3 is in the laying of the gun. You have these three main features. First, the computer, which is used, to adjust for the various factors, wind, et cetera.

Mr. BINGHAM. Excuse me. You are using the term "laying of the gun." I am not familiar with that term.

General GRAVES. Actually, when you point a gun, you say laying.

Mr. BINGHAM. You mean pointing.

General GRAVES. Yes. The jargon is laying the gun.

Second, the laser rangefinder. That is important because the elevation of the gun, to allow for the trajectory of the bullet falling as it goes, depends on the range. So, the laser rangefinder gives you more accuracy than an optical rangefinder, which is based on using your two eyes to judge how far.

Finally, the tank thermal site, which gives you the capability to operate without any illumination. The M60–A1 has an infrared search light, and, of course, when it turns that on to illuminate the target, it itself becomes much more visible to somebody on the other side who may have infrared equipment. So the advantage of the tank thermal sight is that it functions on the thermal energy that is the heat of the target, and it doesn't have to have any kind of a searchlight.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Actually, General Graves, this is our most sophisticated tank, is it not?

General GRAVES. No, sir. The XM–1 is our most sophisticated tank.

Mr. GILMAN. Next to the XM–1 which is not in the field yet, you would regard this as our most sophisticated weapon?

General GRAVES. Yes.

Mr. GILMAN. Are we delaying any supply to our own inventory by this proposed sale?

General GRAVES. Not the sale to Jordan, no, sir.

STRUCTURE OF JORDANIAN FORCES

Mr. GILMAN. In prior testimony you talked about maintaining the limits of four divisions. How has this changed?

General GRAVES. There would still be four divisions, but it would complete the modernization of the two. In the four-division structure today, there are two infantry brigades that are not mechanized. That is what we call straight leg. They walk or they ride.

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Mr. GILMAN. The four divisions you contemplated before was 407 tanks, was it not?

General GRAVES. That is true. We would add, instead of having 16 tank battalions, we would go to 18 tank battalions.

Mr. GILMAN. Why are we increasing that? Is there something that has changed that requires this?

General GRAVES. This was in the original plan for these four divisions, that ultimately over time, they would be modernized so that they would include 18 tank battalions. But along the way, I think partly because of money, Jordan had never made definite plans to go beyond 16. Now they would like to fill out the whole force structure of the 18 battalions.

NUMBER OF TANKS

Mr. GILMAN. Which would mean how many tanks?

General GRAVES. In the final analysis, 849 tanks.

Mr. GILMAN. Wasn't there some agreement that we felt was or should be the limit of their mechanized capabilities?

General GRAVES. When we talked to you a year ago about a sale of 300 tanks, Jordan was talking to us about 16 battalions. What Jordan said to us, at that time, was if you sell us tanks, we will retire, dispose of, M–48 tanks on a 1-for-1 basis, so that in the end we will only have enough tanks for 16 battalions.

Jordan has evaluated the matter further and decided that they will go to the full 18 battalions contemplated when we studied the matter with them in 1973. So it is a higher number of tanks in the end this year than we were discussing with you a year ago, but it is not higher than the ultimate structure that we have discussed with the Jordanians in the past.

Mr. GILMAN. What was the maximum number we discussed in the past with Jordan?

General GRAVES. Actually, we had a study which went as high as 972 tanks.

Mr. GILMAN. And we agreed to that in the past?

General GRAVES. I wouldn't want to say we had agreed to that. It was a study of how they would restructure their army from five divisions to four divisions. It is part of the modernization process that they would end up with 18 tank battalions and each tank battalion would have 54 tanks. That was the U.S. table of organization.

Since then they have adopted a table of organization with only 44 tanks, and, in fact, they never fulfilled their battalions with more than 35. Now they are trying to go and fill 18 battalions with 44 tanks.

EFFECT OF SALE ON OTHER COUNTRIES' NEEDS

Mr. GILMAN. If we sell them the additional 100, does this revision of tank strength from about 700 to 849 change the balance of military power in that region, and will it necessitate others coming in with requests for additional equipment?

General GRAVES. I don't believe so because the increases on the part of other countries in the region have tended to leave Jordan behind. Israel has increased its strength by about 50 percent. Syria and Iraq have increased about double their tank strength. Jordan's tank strength has not grown over the same period. So this increase,

which is only about 25 percent for Jordan, represents less of an increase than its neighbors. So I wouldn't think there would be justification for compensating growth from the other side from this step.

Mr. SAUNDERS. Jordan's tank inventory is by far the smallest of any country in this region, by half.

CHANGE IN TANK FORCE STRUCTURE

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Saunders, when you testified before us last year you said whatever the tank mix would be, you received assurances that it would not exceed a total of 4-division structure of 734 tanks. I assume now that there are some important reasons why you have changed that position.

Mr. SAUNDERS. Yes. At that time we were talking about a sale of up to 300 tanks within the then-existing 16-battalion structure within the 4 divisions. The Jordanians decided not to go that route. They decided to buy British tanks, and the other decision they made during the course of the winter has been, as General Graves said, to go from 16 battalions to 18 battalions, still within the 4-division structure. So they have made two decisions over the winter. And what we are saying here is that we are still operating within that structure, that four-division structure, but the Jordanians have decided to add the two extra——

Mr. GILMAN. So what you are telling us is there really is not anything mentioned about the number of pieces of armor that we are selling them. If they decide, for example, to go for another two divisions, you would just increase the number of tanks.

Mr. SAUNDERS. I think two divisions would be major. I think that would be an increase by half again of the total of Jordanian military forces.

Mr. GILMAN. What I am trying to derive here in the testimony is whether there is some reason for the limitation of, say, 734 tanks last year?

Mr. SAUNDERS. What we were doing last year is to say the Jordanians were willing to retire old tanks in the process of adding new ones and to stay generally within the tank levels that they had at that time.

Mr. GILMAN. And we agreed those were reasonable tank levels, did we not?

Mr. SAUNDERS. We had agreed in 1973, in doing a study, that a reasonable 4-division structure with 18 battalions might include as many as 970 tanks. The Jordanians had never gone that far.

Mr. GILMAN. Did we agree that was a reasonable figure last year, that 900 figure?

Mr. SAUNDERS. Last year, we were talking about the existing inventory of 734, but we have over the years talked about anything up to 970. But what we had last year was an agreement that they would stay at about their same level as it then stood.

Mr. GILMAN. So you are telling us that anything up to 900 is a reasonable figure for Jordan.

Mr. SAUNDERS. As I said before you came in, the purpose of the numbers on this chart is not to engage in a game of arithmetic: Is 15 right, is 75 wrong, and so on. It just doesn't work that way. I put the numbers this way so that everyone would have a range of touchstones against which to judge what is a reasonable size Jordanian army.

I guess what we are saying here is that anything within this range would probably be as far as proportionate to the needs. That is not to say that it would not increase some time in the future. After all, look at the inventories in Syria and Iraq: Syria has continued to go up much faster than Jordan, and so on. These numbers are not meant to be immutable. They are meant to provide a reasonable yardstick against which to measure, to get some sense of what we are doing here, to give you a sense of a range.

Mr. GILMAN. That is what I want to understand. Anything up to 900 at the present time is still considered reasonable for Jordan's strength?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I would think so. The 54 tanks, if you look at the top, you get to the number 972 by talking about tank battalions that are essentially the strength of U.S. tank battalions. The Jordanians today, instead of talking about 54 tanks per battalion, have only talked about 44. So far that seems to have been what they regarded as reasonable to their needs.

Mr. GILMAN. If Jordan were to come in and next year ask for another 200 tanks, you don't foresee any problem there?

Mr. SAUNDERS. We might regard 200 as perhaps more than they would need at that point.

General GRAVES. I would only offer this. In terms of the force which they feel they can reasonably support financially and with manpower and in terms of the munitions which that force has and with which it is employed, I think the Jordanians are comfortable with a four-division force.

CONSIDERATIONS IN FORMING TANK FORCE

Mr. GILMAN. Are those the only considerations, General, whether they can man it and pay for it?

General GRAVES. No; I would say there are three main considerations: First, the threat, as they perceive it, on their borders; second, a reasonable defense plan in terms of the terrain and the areas that they are trying to protect in their country; and third, their ability to support the force from the point of view of manpower or finances, and so forth.

It appears to me from the dialog that I have engaged in with them at the various meetings that we have had that they feel that a four-division force is the right force. After all, they had a five-division force at one time and went back to four divisions. I think one thing that has prevented them from manning the full 18 battalions probably has been finances, and perhaps, to an extent manpower. But now they feel that they can do it.

Mr. GILMAN. The 18 battalions would fall within the 4-division force.

General GRAVES. That is correct. Just to make that crystal clear, they have a certain number of armored brigades and a certain number of mechanized infantry brigades, and with each armored brigade they have two tank battalions. They have three of those armored brigades per armored division, and with each mechanized infantry brigade they have one tank battalion. So 4 times 3 is 12, and 2 times 3 is 6, and that is 18.

JORDAN'S POSITION ON CAMP DAVID

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Saunders, in reviewing your testimony from last year, I note that we talked about Jordan's approach to the Camp David Accords and how helpful it had been. Has there been any change at all in Jordan's approach to the peace process since you last appeared before the committee?

Mr. SAUNDERS. The Jordanians still do not feel able to join the negotiations on autonomy under the Camp David process. I think the Jordanians have recommitted themselves to join negotiations within the framework of resolution 242 when they feel those negotiations could produce a result which would be consistent with their needs as they see them.

I think that the King is prepared to think further about things that could be done that would be supplementary to the negotiations that are now going on that could provide other ways of going about meeting the concerns of Palestinians within the framework of assuring the Israeli security, but at this point he has come forward with no particular proposal.

Mr. GILMAN. In talking with Ambassador Strauss and, more recently, with Ambassador Linowitz, they both underscore the importance and the critical nature of Jordan's involvement in the peace process, and yet we continually hear that there has been no progress made in that direction. I am at a loss to understand why we rush headlong into supplying military equipment to Jordan when there is a consistent policy by Jordan of failing to come forward, and to be helpful in these processes.

Mr. SAUNDERS. In response to earlier questions I said it seems to me that the military supply relationship is designed to address Jordan's needs as a nation, to address the security and stability of that country so that there will be a platform there for launching reasonable participation in the peace process.

It happens at the current time that the Jordanians have a practical disagreement with us over the way the peace process is being conducted. They don't believe the autonomy talks are going to go far enough to provide a viable outcome, one that could be accepted by either Jordan or the Palestinians.

Mr. GILMAN. Isn't it more than a tactical difference? It is an unwillingness to sit at the table to even discuss the issues to try to find a resolution of the issues. How are we going to resolve it if they are unwilling to sit at a table to dig into the various aspects of the issue?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I don't think that is the issue. I think they have gone a good way over the years in exchanging views over what is required for peace, and they at this point feel—and this is their judgment—that the policies of the present Government of Israel do not provide a basis for negotiations.

The Jordanians are prepared to negotiate. They have indicated that many years ago on the basis of Resolution 242.

Mr. GILMAN. Then you are satisfied with the Jordanian views and their approach to the peace accords?

Mr. SAUNDERS. We would rather have them sitting at the table and joining the autonomy talks. If they do not see their way clear to do that, then it seems to me it remains important to preserve their

stability as a potential partner in the peace process when we reach a point where we can persuade them to join the process.

Mr. GILMAN. Eighteen divisions are necessary to preserve stability?

ROLE OF JORDANIAN MILITARY FORCES

Mr. SAUNDERS. I would think it is a relatively modest force for doing that. They do, as I say, play a role. We haven't mentioned this so far, but they do play a role in helping to preserve the larger stability of the region. They have military advisers in the gulf. They prevent terrorism from taking place from their own territory.

It seems to me, not being a military expert, that the experts are saying that this is a modest force given the problems that Jordan has. But again, I would caution against measuring one battalion against a peace process, or two battalions against participation in Camp David. I don't think that is a game that we are engaged in. I think what we are trying to do is preserve a viable potential partner in one of the most important aspects of the peace process.

If you could envision a different kind of country where Jordan is today, I think you could envision a lot more problems than we have there now and a partner who would be totally unwilling to participate in the peace process. It seems to me that is what we are engaged in. You are talking about a long-term relationship with Jordan as a moderate country in the Middle East, and it seems to me not unfair to say that other friends of the United States in this area have a very strong interest in the role the United States plays in helping moderate countries to preserve their own security and stability.

The American position in the Middle East, our ability to play a role there is important to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan, all of these countries. And part of our playing a role there is being a dependable partner when countries come to us and say their security requires this and can you provide it.

I think the other factor that strikes me is that there is no other capital in the world today where you would have heard what I have said and what General Graves has said. We have laid out a force structure 7 years ago. We have felt that as a matter of restraint in the provision of arms, it is important to stay within a modest force structure. We have an agreement that old tanks will be retired 1 for 1 when new tanks will be provided.

That is the kind of restraint in military supply policy that you certainly don't find among other military suppliers who just go out and sell things for the sake of the profit involved. It is that kind of involvement, it seems to me, and that kind of responsibility, that kind of collaboration with the governments involved, that they are willing to go along with us in those kinds of arrangements.

It seems to me that moderate governments in the area have a great stake in preserving that kind of American program in the area. There are larger things at stake here as well as the very important question of whether or not Jordan is engaged in this particular set of negotiations.

Mr. GILMAN. I think we all agree that the objectives are set. I think we would agree we would much rather see a true partnership that both partners are willing to reach out and do something, and not a unilateral attempt.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAUNDERS. We would all agree with that. I think in the conduct of something as complex as the peace process, you would find that each party has its own way of going about it. I don't think you would find 100 percent agreement among any of the parties of the peace process about how it should be conducted. If we did, we would have agreements rather than negotiations.

Mr. GILMAN. I would like to see a little more initiative from Jordan, though.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Solarz.

U.S. POLICIES ON ARMS SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, presumably one of our major interests in the Middle East is to promote the Camp David process, which was a singular diplomatic achievement for which I think our country can take a good deal of credit. I suppose that one way to encourage other countries to participate in that process is to demonstrate that those who do enjoy the full benefits of the appreciation of America, while those who don't do not. I think that is one of the reasons we have been so generous in the aid we have provided to Egypt.

In those terms, to what extent is our willingness to provide military assistance to a country which has been hostile to the Camp David agreement sending precisely the wrong kinds of signals to other Arab countries? Don't we, in effect, say to the rest of the Arab world, whether you are with us or against us in the Camp David process, you can still count on American assistance if you need it? So, what is the incentive, if that is the case, for them to participate in the process insofar as one of the factors they take into account is that future relationship with the United States?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I think the incentives are far more profound than 100 tanks or 200 tanks. I have found in 13 years of working in this process, since the 1967 war, that it is an unproductive exercise on anybody's part to say that 50 airplanes given to Israel or 100 tanks to Jordan or something else somewhere else is going to make the difference between one judgment and another when that nation's vital interests in the near future are concerned.

It seems to me the incentives for other nations are that we are the leader of the free world. We do contribute to the stability of this area in very fundamental ways. We are the only nation in the world that has shown the ability and the determination and perseverance to make a peace process, to put one together and make one work, as you have readily pointed out with regard to Camp David.

Jordan's commitment to peace with Israel is there. It is sound and I think it is unquestionable. Its commitment to Resolution 242 and the peace based on 242 is unquestionable. The stability of Jordan is essential to there being any peace process at all in the long term. It seems to me that preserving the kind of relationship we have with Jordan in a fundamental way, preserving moderate leadership in that critical place, is an incentive on both sides. It is not whether or not Jordan follows one policy in a given year or another policy that makes the difference.

U.S. SIGNALS TO COUNTRIES IN AREA

Mr. SOLARZ. I think, Mr. Secretary, you have trivialized the argument. I am not suggesting 100 tanks are going to buy anybody's support, but I think there is a larger symbolic aspect to this transaction. Let me perhaps offer an analogy which can focus my concerns a little bit better.

In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the President determined it would not be in our interest to continue to conduct business as usual as if nothing had happened, lest the Soviets come to the conclusion that they could invade other countries with impunity, without having to pay any kind of a price for it.

In a similar sense, given the overriding importance which we attached to the Camp David agreement, isn't it in our interest to signal to the other countries in the region that how they respond to that treaty and that process will in some way affect our relationship with them; that we will not continue to conduct business completely as usual regardless of the position they take, lest they come to the conclusion that their attitude toward the Camp David agreement, whatever else it may mean, will have no impact or implications on their relationship with us?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I think I would make two points in response. First of all, any analogy between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which is in violation of international law and the principles of the U.N. Charter, the principles of nonalinement and so on, and the fact that Jordanians have chosen not to enter a particular negotiation—I just don't find these as being equitable at all. The Camp David process is important, but what is fundamental is the process of negotiating peace.

Jordan remains committed to that. They have chosen at this particular point not to join the negotiations, but they have not violated international law. Yet there has been adjustment in the AID programs, for instance. As Jordan has received more money from Arab countries, our AID programs have gone down. Maybe that is where you apply the principle that you are trying to apply, but I don't think you exact your punishment on Jordan for having made this decision about not joining the negotiations.

MODERATION IN ARAB WORLD

Mr. SOLARZ. What would you say in the wake of Camp David is the operative definition of moderation in the Arab world?

Mr. SAUNDERS. A willingness to negotiate peace with Israel if you are talking about the negotiating context. I think another definition of moderation has to do with how one deals with neighbors, not engaging in subversion, supporting terrorism and acts of that kind.

Mr. SOLARZ. By those criteria would you consider Jordan a moderate Arab country?

Mr. SAUNDERS. By all of those criteria, yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would you consider Syria a moderate Arab country by those criteria?

Mr. SAUNDERS. Today I would not.

Mr. SOLARZ. Why not? Which of those criteria does it fail to meet? Are they unwilling to negotiate peace with Israel?

Mr. SAUNDERS. They have been unwilling to join in active negotiations since 1974, and——

Mr. SOLARZ. They were willing to go to Geneva in the same sense Jordan was. There was never an agreement on the basis of going to Geneva, but in principle they were prepared to go.

Mr. SAUNDERS I am not sure the Syrians were prepared to go to Geneva. We never had an acceptance from them. As a matter of fact, the fact that we never had an answer from them was one of the issues pending at the time that Sadat went to Jerusalem.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is it your position that Jordan is prepared to negotiate a peace with Israel but Syria is not under existing cirsumstances?

Mr. SAUNDERS. Jordan is. I don't know whether Syria is or not. It is not an issue of active discussion with the Syrians at this point. We have not been able to engage them in that process. What they would say is that they are prepared to negotiate peace but in a different way from the course that we are now following.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, clearly that is the King's position. He is willing to negotiate peace but in a different way from the one we are following. So they are both willing to negotiate peace but in different ways. In what sense do you consider Jordan moderate but Syria not?

Mr. SAUNDERS. Jordan is still in close collaboration with the United States in carrying out a number of objectives that are in the common interest of both of them. They play a role in the security of the Arabian Peninsula. They are prepared to negotiate peace, as I say, with Israel. They have stated that on a number of occasions.

Mr. SOLARZ. You would not suggest that we sell any arms to Syria?

Mr. SAUNDERS. No, I am not.

DISPOSITION OF M-48'S

Mr. SOLARZ. I am not clear from these charts and your testimony when these M–48's are actually going to be retired. Assuming we proceed with the sale, by when would they be eliminated from the Jordanian inventory?

Mr. SAUNDERS. There is no schedule either for our impending sale which has not yet been approved, although General Graves indicated what the delivery schedule might be. There is similarly no precise schedule for the retirement of the M–48 tanks.

What we have done over the last year is to work out a number of possible customers to whom Jordan might transfer those old tanks. There are more available customers than there are tanks, so I would think over the period of delivery it would be possible to go through the process of disposal.

Mr. SOLARZ. This is an important point because your calculation is designed to demonstrate that even with this sale, given their presumptive intention to dispose of the M–48's, the actual increase in the Jordanian inventory will be relatively limited, which would not be the case if they didn't dispose of the M–48's.

Mr. SAUNDERS. They have agreed to dispose of the M–48's.

Mr. SOLARZ. Over what period of time?

Mr. SAUNDERS. We have not gotten to the point of discussing a schedule, nor have we gotten to the point of saying that a sale is ready to be consummated. But I would assume——

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you expect them to be disposed of in a year or two?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I would think it would be reasonable to assume they would be disposed of over the same period of time which it would take to deliver the new order, which, as General Graves said, would be something over 2 years.

Mr. SOLARZ. You think by the time you submit a letter of offer for the second 100 tanks, we will know what the plans are for the disposal of the M–48's?

Mr. SAUNDERS. Certainly before we reached a decision, we ought to know more about it by then.

General GRAVES. Let me introduce some factors which I think will weigh as far as the Jordanians are concerned. In the first place, the demand for M–48 tanks exceeds the supply. The reason for that is for many countries that confront less danger than Jordan, and M–48 tank is a useful tank. For instance, we were selling M–48 tanks to Thailand. So Jordan has a lot of customers that are pressing them. That is one motivation.

Another motivation is that Jordan can't support all of these tanks. In other words, if they have new tanks, they don't want these other tanks. I think what we will work out will be a schedule with Jordan that will give us reasonable assurances that Jordan is not going to stockpile M–48 tanks. When they have the new tanks, they will get rid of the old ones.

Mr. SOLARZ. It is your testimony now that you are absolutely confident and sure that if this sale goes through, that Jordan intends to dispose of its existing inventory of M–48's.

Mr. SAUNDERS. That is our current understanding.

Mr. SOLARZ. That will presumably be done in the relatively near future, not in the distant future.

General GRAVES. Right. Let me give you one more reason why. These tanks are old. They can't keep them running any more unless they rebuild them. Therefore, they are going to get rid of them.

Mr. SOLARZ. Therefore, if they decide not to dispose of them, you would say you have been misled about their intentions; is that correct?

General GRAVES. Yes.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE M–60A3 AND THE CHIEFTAIN

Mr. SOLARZ. Finally, General Graves, I gather from your testimony that you have taken the position that if we don't sell Jordan the M–60A3's, they are most likely to go out and buy 100 Chieftains.

General GRAVES. Correct.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you describe for us the difference between the M–60A3 and the Chieftain? Which in military terms is superior?

General GRAVES. The main difference is that the Chieftain has a 120-millimeter gun.

Mr. SOLARZ. What does the M–60A3 have?

General GRAVES. A 105 millimeter.

Mr. SOLARZ. I don't know about these things, but I assume that a 120 is better than a 105.

General GRAVES. Well——

Mr. SOLARZ. Does it shoot farther, make a bigger bang?

General GRAVES. Presumably, the projectile is heavier; therefore, it has a greater penetrating power against enemy armor.

Mr. SOLARZ. The Chieftain does?

General GRAVES. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. That is the main difference? What about range, speed, and night fighting capability?

General GRAVES. Range is not the main difference because range is a question of engagement. You can shoot farther than you can see, so it is a question of penetrating power.

Mr. SOLARZ. What is the cost of 100 Chieftains versus 100 M–60A3's?

General GRAVES. It is higher.

Mr. SOLARZ. What is higher?

General GRAVES. The Chieftains are higher.

Mr. SOLARZ. How much?

General GRAVES. I think in the neighborhood of 25 percent.

Mr. SOLARZ. If you were the chief of staff of the Jordanian military, would you prefer 100 Chieftains or 100 M–60A3's?

General GRAVES. I would prefer the M–60's, given the other mix of weapons, because I have certain formations that I am equipping and I want to bring a couple of my divisions up to speed with M–60's. Those are the brigades that now have the M–48's. What I want to do is equip them, so I standardize a portion of my force with U.S. weapons.

Mr. SOLARZ. How much of an advantage is that standardization aspect?

General GRAVES. I think it is important when you are supporting the tanks in battle, and I think it is important over the long haul in terms of relations with the United States.

Mr. SOLARZ. If you were the commander in chief of the eastern front for Isreal and war broke out between Israel and Jordan, would you rather face 100 additional Chieftains or 100 additional M–60A3's?

General GRAVES. I think that is a tough call.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, how do you call it? That is why you are here, to make these tough judgments. We need your help.

General GRAVES. You ought to get General Eiton here to answer that question, not me. I am not a tank expert, so I don't know. I think in terms of lethality, the Chieftain with the bigger gun is more dangerous; but then you have all these other things about the maintenance of the tank and so forth and so on. So the question is whether the formation equipped with M–60's——

POSSIBILITY OF TANKS CROSSING THE JORDAN RIVER

Mr. SOLARZ. Can either of you give assurances that these tanks will never cross the Jordan River?

Mr. SAUNDERS. You know the answer to that as well as anybody. One can't predict what is going to happen. I think we would be misleading people if we talked about how this equipment would be used in the future. On the other hand, you have to read that answer in the context of the commitment by Jordan to a negotiated peace settlement with Israel. I couldn't, if I were testifying on the sale of equipment to Israel, give a comparable commitment that it would not be used across Israel's borders. It doesn't really work that way.

Mr. SOLARZ. But the agreement would contain the language prohibiting the use of these weapons for offensive purposes.

Mr. SAUNDERS. It would be the language in any of our agreements saying that the equipment would be used for internal stability and self-defense.

Mr. SOLARZ. One final question, Mr. Chairman. Would we consider an unprovoked Jordanian attack against Israel, in a situation in which Israel did not fire the shot against Jordan and in which Jordan would send those tanks across the Jordan River, to be the use of those weapons prescribed by the agreement?

Mr. SAUNDERS. If it were not self-defense, it would be a violation of the agreement.

Mr. SOLARZ. I am trying to deal with the agreement which the Jordanians might conceivably make that this is occupied territory that they were sending the tanks into, so it was not really an offensive use. We would not accept that argument.

Mr. SAUNDERS. No. We are so thoroughly committed to the resolution of that problem by peaceful means and so thoroughly opposed to using military attack as a means of solving these problems that I just can't see our position being at variance with that.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Gentlemen, I wonder if you could furnish for us a rundown on the tank balance in the Middle East, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, for Jordan, Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and any other nation.

Mr. SAUNDERS. We have this on a classified basis, if that is OK with you.

Mr. HAMILTON. You already have that prepared?

Mr. SAUNDERS. I have a copy with me.

General GRAVES. It would have to be classified.

Mr. HAMILTON. We will accept that for the record, without objection.[1]

OTHER SOURCES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR JORDAN

Is Jordan seeking any military equipment from the Soviet Union?

General GRAVES. I am not aware that they have any definite plans.

Mr. SAUNDERS. There were some reports earlier in the year that if King Hussein were to make a visit to Moscow—and none is presently planned—that there might be some discussion of some kinds of military equipment which we had not been able to provide. None of the types, as I recall, that were mentioned in this had to do with armor, but the issue of a visit to Moscow is not an active one at this point.

Mr. HAMILTON. At the present time, Jordan is not acquiring any arms from the Soviet Union, to the best of your knowledge?

General GRAVES. That is my answer. I am sure they have considered whether or not there were Soviet arms that would be suitable for them.

Mr. HAMILTON. Are they requesting any other military equipment from any other source other than the sources that you have discussed this afternoon, to your knowledge?

[1] This information has been supplied on a classified basis and is retained in subcommittee files.

General GRAVES. Of course, they have acquired the Mirage aircraft. It is my understanding that they have not made any definite plans for anything beyond that.

OTHER POSSIBLE U.S. SALES

Mr. HAMILTON. Do they want any U.S. advanced aircraft?

General GRAVES. They had requested advanced U.S. aircraft.

Mr. HAMILTON. What kind?

General GRAVES. F–16's.

Mr. HAMILTON. What did we say?

General GRAVES. We declined to provide that.

Mr. HAMILTON. I am not sure why you gentlemen are reluctant to commit yourselves to a tank disposal agreement on a one-on-one basis or something of that sort in writing.

Mr. SAUNDERS. I think there may be a misunderstanding. I said we had a letter from the Jordanians which states that there will be a disposal of the M–48 in the context of this sale.

Mr. HAMILTON. On a one-on-one replacement basis? Is that in the letter?

Mr. SAUNDERS. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. I did not understand that, and I appreciate the clarification.

Are there any other questions? If not, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

UNITED STATES-JORDANIAN RELATIONS AND ARMS SUPPLY ISSUES

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 27, 1980

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND MIDDLE EAST,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, at 2:05 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. The meeting of the subcommittee will come to order.

Today the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East meets to discuss United States-Jordanian relations.

This is our second hearing in the last month on the subject of our relations with Jordan.

On July 29 the subcommittee held a hearing to consider the proposed sale of 100 M-60A3 tanks to Jordan.

The interest of many members in today's hearing is more general. While most members regret that Jordan has not been involved in the peace talks in the last 3 years, several members are anxious about the future course of United States-Jordanian relations, about the sturdiness of Jordan's commitment to U.N. Resolution 242 and to the peace process, and about what is the appropriate United States-Jordanian military relationship for the future.

Several members wish to address some of these concerns today.

For more than three decades, Jordan has been a fairly consistent force for moderation and stability in the strife-torn Middle East. King Hussein, the longest serving leader in the region, has been an important friend of the United States.

Today our dialog with Jordan continues but there is no doubt that our differences on the peace process and the next steps in negotiations vary widely. Serious attention must be given in the coming months to strengthening United States-Jordanian ties and to bringing Jordan into peace talks.

We are happy to have with us to testify Morris Draper, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State.

I will ask Congressman Rosenthal if he would like to make a statement at this time before we turn to your testimony, Mr. Draper.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I feel it is extraordinarily important that you permit me an opportunity to express my views on this vital subject because in a sense it relates not

only to the sale of the 100 M–60A3 tanks, but to the future relationship between the United States and Jordan.

As you know, House Concurrent Resolution 396, which called for the disapproval of the proposed sale to Jordan of 100 M–60A3 tanks and related defense articles and services obtained 14 cosponsors.

It was initiated by Mr. Bingham, Mr. Solarz, and myself. In addition to those three, it was signed on to and supported by the following members of the Foreign Affairs Committee: Mr. Mica, Mr. Wolff, Mr. Gray, Mr. Barnes, Mr. Hall, Mr. Wolpe, Mr. Gilman, Mr. Ireland, Mr. Bonker, Mr. Winn, and Mrs. Fenwick.

It is important to note that the time has expired for this resolution to be efficacious. One of the reasons, I think, in the failure to bring the resolution to a vote before the full committee was the fact that there was not a similar movement in support of this concurrent resolution in the other body, and, because of that, I feel it incumbent to review briefly with your kind permission, Mr. Chairman, the situation as I see it concerning the foundation of the U.S. relationship with the Kingdom of Jordan and to examine the possible future course of the relationship.

Above all, I seek an answer to the question: How are the interests of the United States served by the present relationship and by the sale of some of our best military equipment to the Jordanian Government?

Since the autumn of 1977, when President Sadat visited Israel, there has been an air of anticipation and hope hovering over the Middle East. The Camp David agreement and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty sustained this atmosphere. Many of us hoped that the next steps toward peace would rapidly ensue. These wishes were unfulfilled as no other Arab country chose to join the Israeli-Egyptian dialog.

The logical next partner to these discussions was the Kingdom of Jordan. The Jordanians have a great deal to gain from reaching a formal peace with Israel. The economic and social rewards of peace would be substantial. I respect King Hussein personally, but the policy of Jordan since Camp David has not been helpful—any more than it was in the past.

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank since 1967 was in reality an unintended consequence of the 6-day war. Had King Hussein heeded the urgent pleas of the Israeli Government, there would have been no fighting between the two, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem would have remained under Jordan's control.

Alas, Hussein chose to enter the war against Israel.

On the Jerusalem question, King Hussein has continuously turned the truth on its head, declaring his commitment to free access to the holy places for all faiths while in fact it was he who denied free access to Jews and Christians from 1953 to 1967.

Knowing this background, it was extremely disappointing that King Hussein spurned the opportunities for negotiation which grew out of the Camp David agreement. Indeed, at a critical moment with a unique opportunity before him, King Hussein chose to publicly oppose the accord, and since then, King Hussein has been a frequent vocal critic of the Camp David agreements and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

King Hussein has enlarged his relationship with Iraq and Syria.
He has failed to encourage a moderate alternative to the PLO.
He has retreated from U.N. Resolution 242.

Regrettably, there has been a marked deterioration in the Middle East since King Hussein's visit here in June. In all quarters the more radical elements have seized the initiative. Israeli citizens have been killed in terrorist attacks. Two Arab mayors on the West Bank were severely injured.

The United Nations continues to host a coarse type of "street theater" in which a perverse logic punishes moderation and fuels the cause of those bent upon confrontation.

Unfortunately, King Hussein has not held himself apart from this deterioration.

On August 13, the Prime Minister of Jordan announced that U.N. Resolution 242 was no longer acceptable to Jordan as the basis for settlement with Israel. Instead, Rimawi proposed the revival of U.N. Resolution 181 of 1947 which was the original instrument for the partition of the British Mandate over Palestine. It was this resolution which every Arab country rejected; and in protest against it, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia declared war upon Israel.

All this caused me grave concern and I wish to draw attention at this time to two serious problems. First, what do these recent statements by the leaders of Jordan mean to the United States as it continues its search for peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors? Second, what criteria is our Government using to determine to whom the United States will sell arms?

There are, to my mind, two reasons for selling sophisticated weapons or weapon-related material to another country. First, one makes the sale because the seller and the purchaser share a significant foreign policy objective and the weapons will be used to aid your cause. Second, you sell the weapons because you want to gain leverage with the buyer and hope that through the sale you gain influence.

For 18 years I have been hearing this argument with respect to Jordan. I would call it the diplomacy of wishful thinking. It hasn't worked in the past; it isn't working today. Why should we expect it to work in the future?

The tanks to Jordan, like the engine cores to Iraq and the additional equipment for the Saudi F–15's are part of our continuing investment in the moderate Arab rulers. The pipedream of a moderate Iraq need not detain us today, and the new equipment for the Saudi F–15's will doubtless detain us after the elections, but how moderate a state is Jordan?

The fact is, King Hussein has exhibited a rather clear double standard: Charm and circumspection in Washington to obtain tanks—tough talk and belligerence in Amman to strengthen his ties to the radical Arab States, and for reasons which escape me, this administration seems to ignore the tough talk over there for the sweet music over here. If we cannot detect the difference between one tune and another, then we haven't the judgment to sell lethal weapons in the large quantities that we do.

The moral responsibility for selling arms is a heavy one, especially when you arm both sides. We support Israel primarily because she is a democratic country with a free and open society very much like our

own. The fundamental principles of the American Republic are practiced in Israel. We support Egypt because of her commitment to peace, because of the courageous decision of President Sadat to take his people away from the brink of war and to seek a better life for Egypt.

Why do we sell arms to Jordan and Iraq and Saudi Arabia? The reasons are less admirable and to mask our fall from principles, we reach for a veil of vague expressions. It is a dangerous exercise. Like many of us, I take these arms sales very seriously. We need to develop a clear and precise set of guidelines for the sale of arms. As yet we have not done so. Even an administration as dedicated to the cause of human rights as this one and as mindful of them too has not been able to discriminate among potential purchasers of our weaponry.

What tortuous reasoning is needed to support some of those sales? Perhaps our committee should set itself the task of creating such guidelines. Perhaps we should do this in conjunction with the President and the Secretary of State. But, while we await such an evaluation, we will have to be vigilant in monitoring what is sent to us for review.

I would argue that Jordan needs to maintain a close working relationship with the United States if she wishes to support her own stability and security. This can only be done if she is prepared to respond in a reasonable way to reasonable American requests in areas vital to our long-term interest.

The only other comment I wanted to make, Mr. Chairman—and I appreciate your kindness and generosity in permitting me this time—is to deplore an argument we have heard in the past—that if we don't sell this equipment and weaponry, then others will.

That argument has been used thoughout the 18 years I have been on this committee. At some point in time where we find the sale antithetical to our principles and in violation of what I perceive to be our national interests, then we will just have to let it happen.

If they want to buy equipment and supplies elsewhere, so be it.

We must cross that Rubicon at some time.

This 100 tank sale is going to go forward, obviously. The question that disturbs me, and those who I think signed on to the resolution of disapproval, is our deep concern whether the administration is going to participate in this arms supply relationship with Jordan and what is going to happen to the next 100 tanks that are presumably part of the same package arrangement?

It is to these issues that I hope we can address ourselves today.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do any other members of the subcommittee wish to make a statement at this time?

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I am not a member of the subcommittee, but if you would, I would just like to say I think Congressman Rosenthal has expressed my views eloquently and precisely.

I am grateful to him for that statement with which I would like to be associated.

I would add to it only that the next sale of 100 tanks will mean a very substantial increase in the military potential of Jordan.

It could be argued that the first 100 tanks were, at least to some extent, replacements for outdated equipment.

I don't think the same can be said for the second sale.

These are relative details, which are unimportant compared to the broader considerations that Mr. Rosenthal has brought forward.

Thank you.

Mr. BARNES. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Barnes.

Mr. BARNES. Thank you.

I hadn't intended to make an opening statement, but lest there be any sense that by silence I was not joining in the statements of my colleagues, I want to say that I think Congressman Rosenthal and the further comment by Congressman Bingham state my own views very well. I think the questions that have been posed are the ones that need to be answered today. I look forward to hearing the discussion of the issues that Congressman Rosenthal articulated so effectively.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Draper, you may proceed. Your statement will be entered into the record in full. We would appreciate a summary of your statement.

STATEMENT OF MORRIS DRAPER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. DRAPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A key point I wanted to make in this statement was the fact that it is often overlooked that King Hussein of Jordan has been one of the handful of Arab leaders who has persistently and consistently looked for ways to get out of the morass the Arabs are in and find a just and peaceful settlement of the Middle East dispute.

He was associated with the drafting and early approval of Security Council Resolution 242. He immediately cooperated with Ambassador Jarring, who was sent out to the Middle East on a mediator mission as part of that resolution.

In 1972, he put forward a concept for resolving at least the West Bank aspects of a general overall peace by proposing a united Arab kingdom, despite great opposition from his peers and colleagues.

He did this at a time when he was a virtual political outcast in part of the Arab world because he had challenged the Fedayeen and destroyed their military power in Jordan.

After the 1973 war, he worked closely with the United States; he supported the initial disengagement agreements, and he has stuck closely to Resolution No. 242 up to the present moment, although he has great skepticism over the course of the Camp David process.

Even so, while exploring other alternative routes to an overall settlement, he has lectured his fellow Arabs on the need to find a credible and pragmatic course which recognizes fully Israel's legitimate security concerns.

He has not come up with such a course as he is the first to admit, but he has never stopped giving thought to this process. I think this is, among other reasons, why American policymakers have decided our close relationship with Jordan can pay dividends; it has paid dividends in the past.

Aside from the Arab/Israeli conflict itself, Jordan has played an increasingly significant and important role in the gulf which serves American interests directly and indirectly.

Those are some of the key points I wanted to stress, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Draper's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MORRIS DRAPER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

THE U.S.-JORDANIAN RELATIONSHIP

Introduction

I welcome the opportunity to testify before this Subcommittee on the historically close U.S.-Jordanian relationship as well as on the important role the U.S. expects Jordan to play in the region in the years ahead. To begin with, I would like to review briefly:

U.S. policies toward Jordan, and U.S. interests in a moderate, stable government which remains ready to make peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242;

Jordan's attitude toward peace-making; and

How our policies toward Jordan fit into the tumultuous period in which King Hussein has led his country, along with our expanding interests in the region and the changing circumstances there.

U.S. interests in and policies toward Jordan

A succession of American Administrations has believed that we should work particularly closely with moderate and like-minded governments such as Jordan to preserve their integrity, to strengthen their abilities to pursue independent policies, and to expand their capacity to respond constructively to inevitable change. Our friends in turn expect us to respond positively and fairly to their legitimate concerns and interests, as well as to some of their honest grievances. We believe that the success of moderate policies will affect the political nature of the region in a useful way and will reinforce the concept of resolving problems—both internal and international—through negotiation and compromise rather than through conflict and confrontation.

American policy toward Jordan, particularly in the last decade, therefore, has been centered on the following major elements:

We intend to assist Jordan in maintaining its independence, its integrity, and its freedom to make decisions of its own despite influences and pressures exerted by other states.

In return, we will want a reasonable degree of Jordanian cooperation in seeking to realize our long-term policy goals of peace, stability, and security for the area.

We will do what we can to reinforce Jordan's willingness and ability to join in a negotiated, comprehensive Middle East peace settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

At the present stage, we will try to set the stage for Jordan's possibly more active involvement in the peace process at an early future moment. Such an opportunity could arise following a satisfactory completion of negotiations for a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza.

We will continue to encourage Jordan's determination to preserve peace along the long border with Israel and the occupied territories.

We will encourage Jordan in its useful role of helping to preserve stability in the Gulf region, including Yemen, through its current programs involving the training of Gulf military personnel and the seconding to certain Gulf states of Jordanian military and security advisors. In this connection we have noted King Hussein's willingness to provide Jordanian forces on a limited scale for deterrent or defensive purposes—if called upon for help—in periods of challenge and tension.

In addition:

We will want to manage our economic and military assistance programs in such a way as to make it clear to Jordan it need not depend—to a possibly unacceptable degree—upon the assistance of states which might want to exact politically difficult demands.

We will want to continue—through the military assistance program, training programs, and the Joint Military Commission—a relationship with Jordan's military establishment, based on mutual trust and confidence, which will reinforce and preserve Jordan's present major dependence on the U.S. and the West for weaponry, for training, and for military doctrine and orientation. It is reasonable to assist Jordan in satisfying its legitimate defense needs.

We will want to maintain a constructive economic assistance program which will advance the day when Jordan will be self-supporting and which meanwhile will contribute to the strengthening of Jordan's institutions and stability.

We will encourage Jordan to maintain good cooperative relationships with the other moderate governments, and to pursue foreign and domestic policies aimed at enhancing stability in the region.

We will continue to acknowledge in appropriate ways the contribution Jordan has been making in providing opportunity—political and economic—to the Palestinian element of its total population.

We intend to work constructively with Jordan for the fair and efficient use of vital water resources in the area.

Jordan's attitudes toward peacemaking

King Hussein is a member of a small handful of Arab statesmen who have persistently applied real and serious thought to ways of securing a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on honorable terms. President Sadat of Egypt and President Bourguiba of Tunisia are others. All—Hussein included—have suffered bitter and unfair criticism—as well as political ostracism—for their courage and convictions. All have been ready to accept the reality of Israel and to recognize Israel's genuine security needs.

Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Jordan adhered to Security Council Resolution 242 as the basis for a settlement and has stuck to that position ever since then; it cooperated with UN Ambassador Jarring's mediatory efforts under that resolution; and it accepted the thrust of the so-called Rogers Plan.

In 1972, Jordan floated a proposal for a United Arab Kingdom encompassing the West and East Banks. While it met strong opposition, the concept would have to be viewed by any objective observer as a serious effort to resolve one of the more sensitive problems in an overall Arab-Israeli peace settlement.

Following the 1973 war, Jordan supported the initial, limited disengagement agreements in the Sinai and Golan; however, it made clear its reservations about the potentially divisive implications—in the Arab world—of the second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement. Jordan appeared ready—in principle—to explore a Jordanian-Israeli disengagement, but nothing materialized.

In 1978, Jordan decided it could not accept the invitation to join the process envisaged in the Camp David Accords; in part it was worried about "partial and incomplete" settlements. We of course disagree with Jordan about the merits of the Camp David approach. But there is no misunderstanding between us on the fact that Jordan still wants a fair and just peace based on the principles of Security Council Resolution 242. King Hussein has made clear to us—as late as in his recent talks in Washington and in his address to the National Press Club—that he will remain skeptical about the Camp David process but open-minded about unfolding developments. Under certain circumstances, he will consider involving Jordan more actively in peace-making efforts.

Consistently since Camp David, King Hussein has advised his fellow Arabs not to be bound by ideological arguments. He has instead urged them to develop an alternative to the Camp David route which, however, would be peaceful, pragmatic, and credible to all parties. He has stressed that the Arab states must exhibit an attitude of reasonableness in lieu of rigid negativism if an honorable end to the Arab-Israeli conflict is to be achieved.

We believe it is important to sustain this pragmatic and open-minded attitude, until developments in the peace negotiations turn what we hope will be a new and fresh page and offer opportunities for accelerated progress.

What kind of Jordan do we want?

It would be short-sighted and irresponsible of us to play down the potential role of Jordan in contributing to area peace and stability.

Jordan will be an indispensable partner to a comprehensive peace and to an accommodation to Israel's critical security requirements. Active Jordanian cooperation will be essential in dealing with the Palestinian problem, including its political and refugee dimensions, among others.

We want Jordan to continue its useful advisory and training activities in the Gulf region, and to continue to act as a responsive and responsible ally of moderate Arab leaders.

Broad American interests will be served well through a continuing, close partnership of the kind that has existed for most of the years of King Hussein's stewardship. This requires, however, that we continue our sound relationship in the military field and consult regularly and systematically about Jordan's legitimate defensive requirements. We cannot expect them to take decisions which they believe would compromise their national security, but we can work with them for prudent programs which will not upset the basic military balance.

In the conduct of our relationship, we should not try to force proven friends of the past into adopting our preferred tactics of the moment. This might be worth trying if we had fundamental differences over our ultimate goal—but the goal of

a just and full peace is common to both Jordan and the United States. Our relationship must revolve about our common interests and our common, long-term objectives.

POSSIBLE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TANKS

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Draper.

I wanted to clarify a couple of things that I think should be clarified as a result of our first hearing.

Are we going to get a request for the second 100 tanks early next year?

Mr. DRAPER. No final decision has been made within the administration.

Mr. HAMILTON. What have you told the Jordanians?

Mr. DRAPER. We have provided them exactly with the statements that have been presented to the Congress in testimony, and we stressed that we will not make a decision until we have a full reading from and full consultations with the Congress.

Mr. HAMILTON. Have you indicated to them you are going to try to push the additional 100-tank sale through the Congress?

Mr. DRAPER. We are still——

Mr. HAMILTON. That you approve of it and you will seek approval of the Congress?

Mr. DRAPER. The members of the Jordanian Government are aware that there is some sympathy within the U.S. Government to provide the second 100 tanks.

Mr. HAMILTON. What does that mean? Some sympathy?

Mr. DRAPER. They are aware it is there.

Mr. HAMILTON. Does that mean the President is going to recommend the second 100?

Mr. DRAPER. I can't say at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. How do they get the impression that there is some sympathy for it?

Mr. DRAPER. Well, I think it is inevitable as part of the kind of relationship we have with the Jordanian military establishment and our close consultations on arms purchases and training and equipment.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Draper, my impression is that you folks in the executive branch have really made up your minds—90 percent of the way if you want to quantify it—to come forward with a request for an additional 100 tanks. Is that impression wrong or right?

Mr. DRAPER. There is certainly support for that idea within the Government, but we have not made a decision up to this point.

Mr. HAMILTON. Have you said to the Jordanian Government that you approve in principle the sale of the additional tanks?

Mr. DRAPER. The request came from Jordan for 200 tanks. We said that we would present to the Congress the first increment of 100 tanks and seek approval and that, depending on our consultations with Congress, we would decide whether or not to go forward with the second increment to complete the 200-tank request that they had.

Mr. HAMILTON. There has been no official statement from our Government to Jordan to indicate that our Government approves the second 100 tanks; is that what you are telling me?

Mr. DRAPER. Approves in the classic sense? The final approval—for example, at the minute before we would go to Congress with the second increment of 100 tanks, if we did decide to do that? No. We haven't reached that point with the Jordanians. We have been very frank in discussing what has taken place and the need to have support from Congress for this kind of policy decision.

Mr. HAMILTON. Are we now talking with the Jordanians about the second 100?

Mr. DRAPER. There hasn't been any active discussion with the Jordanians since the testimony by Mr. Saunders and the presentation to the Congress of the first request for 100 tanks.

UNITED STATES AND BRITISH TANKS

Mr. HAMILTON. Does it make any military sense at all for the Jordanians to have a hundred of these M–60A3 tanks and mix it in with some British tanks? Does that make any sense from a military standpoint?

Mr. DRAPER. I am not a military expert, but I have been informed by military planners that their plans for the 200 M–60A3's, combined with the removal and disposition of the obsolescent M–48, would create a structure that is roughly triangular in that Jordan would have forces composed almost equally of Chieftains, rebuilt Centurion tanks, and the M–60's.

UNDERSTANDING ON DISPOSITION OF THE M–48 TANKS

Mr. HAMILTON. That was another point that wasn't clear to me as a result of the last hearing. The precise nature of the understanding with Jordan as to the disposition of the M–48 tanks as the M–60A3 tanks are delivered.

What is our understanding with Jordan with regard to that?

Mr. DRAPER. We developed that understanding in 1979. At that time you may recall, Mr. Chairman, the Jordanians were exploring with us the purchase of 300 M–60A3's. At that time our concern focused on the disposition of the obsolescent M–48's, and in August of 1979 we received assurances orally and in writing that those tanks, the M–48 tanks, would be disposed of essentially on a one-for-one basis as M–60's would come into the inventory.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is with regard to the first 100?

Mr. DRAPER. That was with regard, Mr. Chairman, to the 300-tank sale which was then being discussed with Jordan.

Mr. HAMILTON. Where are we now? You already have come in with a request for a hundred. That is going to go through.

What is your understanding with regard to the hundred? Are they going to on a 1-to-1 basis, take one M–48 out of service and put one M–60 in for each one received?

Mr. DRAPER. The logic, Mr. Chairman, is that they should dispose of all——

Mr. HAMILTON. What? What did you say? The logic?

Mr. DRAPER. The logic.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is the agreement?

Mr. DRAPER. The agreement is what I referred to as taking place in 1979, which we believe will apply as we supply M–60's, certainly on a 1-to-1 basis.

Mr. HAMILTON. Wait a minute. I want to be very clear on this.

When you deliver one M–60, they take one M–48 out of service, is that right? With regard to the 100 tanks?

Is that the agreement?

Mr. DRAPER. That is basically the understanding we believe we have; yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is the understanding we have, is that correct?

Mr. DRAPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is there any understanding at all with regard to the second 100 tanks, if the sale is requested and approved?

Mr. DRAPER. If we propose the second 100 tanks, making a total sale of 200 M–60A3's, our belief is that all 283 M–48 tanks will be removed from Jordan.

I might add, Mr. Chairman, that we worked actively already with the Jordanian authorities in discussing probable places where these tanks can be sold. We have started already—and I believe we are almost ready to complete an understanding—to have Jordan sell some tanks, a modest number, to Lebanon prior to any of the acquisitions of M–60A3's.

There are customers that I think would meet our basic arms control conditions——

Mr. HAMILTON. I am not worried about the customers right now, Mr. Draper.

I am just concerned about the understanding. My impression from your testimony is that we have a clear agreement with Jordan with regard to the 100 tanks, M–60 tanks, the sale of which has now been approved and also with regard to the second 100, if it is approved, that Jordan will withdraw at least one M–48 for each M–60 that it acquires, right?

Mr. DRAPER. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. My understanding also is—going back to my earlier questions—that we have not indicated to the Jordanians at this point that the President, the executive branch, will approve and seek to gain the approval of the Congress for a second 100 tanks? That you have not done that?

Mr. DRAPER. No, sir.

Mr. BINGHAM. Will the chairman yield for a moment?

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Bingham.

CHIEFTAIN SALES AND DISPOSITION OF M–48 TANKS

Mr. BINGHAM. On this question of the disposition of the M–48 tanks, on page 6 of your statement of July 29, it seemed quite clear to me that the plan was that when the Jordanians received the 274 British Chieftains, they were going to dispose of the 283 M–48's.

That was going to get rid of the M–48's.

Now, in light of that, it seems to me—page 6 of the July statement, not today's statement—so it would seem to me that you can't say they are going to get rid of M–48 tanks as they receive M–60A3 tanks, and also say that they are getting rid of the M–48 tanks as they receive British Chieftain tanks.

Do you have your statement of July?

Mr. DRAPER. I am looking at page 6, Mr. Bingham.

Would it be helpful to read the phrase I believe you mentioned so that I am sure I understand which phrase it is?

Mr. BINGHAM. I will read it. It is in the middle of page 6. You say "Jordanians have on order 274 British Chieftains."

That would bring the total inventory to 947 tanks, more than the Jordanians want.

The next sentence is, "They are, however, planning to dispose of the M–48's."

Now, in the preceding sentence you said that they have 283 M–48 tanks. That is only nine more than the number of British Chieftains that they are going to acquire anyway.

Mr. DRAPER. I recognize your point. I think what we were trying to put across was that there is an explicit linkage between the provision of M–60A3's from the United States, but there is also a certain reason to expect that if the Jordanian total inventory is too large, as a result of the Chieftain purchase, then they will want to get rid of some of their M–48's.

That was the intent of that particular coupling of sentences, but we cannot be sure. In the case of our proposals to sell M–60A3's to the Jordanians, we do have the oral and written understanding, and we have the history of our relationship with Jordan, to make possible the cooperative disposal of the M–48's.

Now, I would like to add, Mr. Bingham, and Mr. Chairman, that the 1-to-1 replacement, in our opinion, would turn out to be a replacement of all the 283 M–48's if we decided to sell Jordan 200 M–60A3's' so it would be more than a 1-to-1 basis.

Mr. BINGHAM. If I may pursue that point just a moment further, Mr. Chairman?

If you look at page 7 of that same statement, you said, "If we go forward with the sale of the second 100 tanks," that is, M–60A3's—"the total impact of both sales would be 150 more tanks than Jordan presently has on the ground."

That, I take it, is assuming that they dispose of all the M–48's?

Mr. DRAPER. That is true.

NUMERICAL FORCE OF JORDANIAN FORCES

Mr. BINGHAM. I don't see how you can say that and at the same time claim that they are going to reduce the force of M–48 tanks as they received the M–60A3's.

Mr. DRAPER. Neither in the July testimony nor today are we trying to create the impression that the numerical strength of the Jordanian forces will be exactly what it was last year.

There is a net numerical increase because the Jordanians, after studying the question for most of the last 7 years, have decided to go for an 18-battalion rather than a 16-battalion tank force.

The total tanks in the Jordanian forces, if 200 M–60A3 tanks were sold to the Jordanians and if the M–48's were disposed of, would result in a force of 849 tanks composed of 308 Centurions—pardon me, a few less—around 300 Centurions, 274 British-built Chieftains, and 282 M–60's.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Bingham, perhaps we better come back to that.

Mr. Rosenthal.

LEGAL STATUS OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What is the current legal status of the relationship between Israel and Jordan?

Mr. DRAPER. It should be considered a state of belligerency.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Which is the same as saying both sides are at war but there is a cease-fire between them?

Mr. DRAPER. A cease-fire is adhered to by both sides.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. When we sell to two sides, two countries that are still in a state of belligerency, do we add any extra precautions or take special concerns about the situation?

Mr. DRAPER. We certainly do, Mr. Rosenthal.

It takes the form in both cases, Israel and Jordan, of consulting closely with the respective governments about the nature of the threats, the needs, and resources. In the case of Jordan, we have an institutionalized arrangement. the Joint Military Commission, and it normaily has at least one meeting a year, sometimes two times a year. Where we discuss Jordan's needs; what we think might be reasonable, and prudent, and try to reach an understanding about the basic force structure for Jordan.

We have had over the years a very intimate and close cooperative working relationship which resulted, among other things, in our advice on the Jordanian decision to reduce their ground forces from five divisions to four divisions.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Without getting bogged down in the military components, my question is, what kind of moral doctrine do we adhere to when we are arming both sides to a conflict, albeit the conflict is momentarily suspended?

Mr. DRAPER. One overriding consideration is the fundamental security of Israel. We do not want to alter the military balance in the region in a way that could have negative repercussions on Israel.

That is one consideration.

Looked at from the Jordanian perspective, we have to see what constitutes legitimate defensive requirements on their part in the light of the almost unlimited supply which some of Jordan's potential adversaries have access to.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you also take into account the development of foreign policy and foreign relations between the principal countries; that is, ourselves and one of the two buyers?

Mr. DRAPER. Yes, of course.

VIEW ON 242

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Am I correct when I said that the Jordanian Prime Minister, on August 13, said that Resolution 242 was no longer acceptable to Jordan?

Mr. DRAPER. The Prime Minister; as we were able to find out at the time and later, was trying to convey the point that 242 was not a completely perfect instrument, and that Jordan had always felt,

despite adhering to 242, that it dealt with only one dimension of the Palestinian problem.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Did you read the radio reports, the full text of his remarks?

Mr. DRAPER. Yes; sir.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you have them there?

Mr. DRAPER. The statement I believe you are referring to was an interview with a Paris-based Arab newspaper in August.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you have the text of his remarks?

It would seem to me that that is an important issue, whether Jordan supports 242 or is drawing away from it.

Are they in fact drawing away from Resolution 242?

Mr. DRAPER. Not in our opinion, Mr. Rosenthal.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. My impression is from reading his speech that in their opinion they are.

Mr. DRAPER. The fact is that Jordan, along with certain other moderate states, has been compelled to deal with the real world in emotion-packed conferences, to try to bring some order out of chaos and to try to forestall the militants and rejectionists from completely dominating the proceedings, the outcomes, the resolutions.

JORDAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY IN THE REGION

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How have they done that? Can you give us any specific examples of what Jordan has done since Camp David and since the Israeli-Egyptian agreement to indicate to us that they have been a force for moderation?

Mr. DRAPER. To take the most recent example, Mr. Rosenthal, we believe that Jordan, along with Morocco and Saudi Arabia, played a moderating role in the just concluded conference on Jerusalem by members of Islamic states which was held in Rabat, Morocco.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Did you read King Hussein's speech?

Mr. DRAPER. Which speech?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. His recent speech on the subject of Jerusalem?

Mr. DRAPER. I have reviewed most of his public statements.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You would describe them as moderating?

Mr. DRAPER. In the context of the heated and emotion-packed atmosphere, I did not find anything unusual in terms of the rhetoric which is customary on those occasions.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I find King Hussein a very charming, personable gentleman. I find the policies less charming and personable.

If you are going to sell the most sophisticated American equipment to two sides to a controversy, then it seems to me that there are certain constraints under which you operate.

One of the fundamentals is the character and nature of the government they have, a democracy versus a dictatorship. We both know the answer to that. We accept that, because we can't change it.

Then you have to look at: Are they contributing to the peace process or are they hindering the peace process by abstention?

Jordan hasn't done one positive thing in terms of bringing the peace process along since Camp David. If you can cite an example, I would be delighted to hear it.

Mr. DRAPER. It is not only the peace process, but the overall situation of stability in the region that has to be examined as well.

It is true that Jordan has not joined the Camp David process. It is skeptical about its outcome and it has doubts about the tactics that have been followed.

Nevertheless, King Hussein has indicated that he will be open-minded about unfolding developments, that he still sticks firmly to Resolution 242, and he will work for a moderate position in the Arab world.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. That I described as you heard in my opening statement, the diplomacy of wishful thinking.

It hasn't worked and it won't work. When do you think we will see positive results from your wishful thinking diplomacy?

Mr. DRAPER. I don't think this is——

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Every member of this committee, when we met with King Hussein, very respectfully and cordially invited him to explain what programs, what ideas, what initiatives he would propose in the near or not so near future as to bring a resolution to the conflict in the Middle East.

My recollection is he didn't answer anyone in a positive way. He said he was thinking about it. They were working on it. They will deal with it.

The question is, does that course of conduct warrant the sale of 100, perhaps 200, of the most sophisticated tanks in the American arsenal?

U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN

Mr. DRAPER. I think we have to look at our relationship with Jordan through its ups and downs over the years and make decisions on that basis.

King Hussein's track record has been good.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. In what way?

Mr. DRAPER. He has served our interests. I think one of the important ways I mentioned is his role in the gulf states, the fact that he sends advisers there for their police and military forces; the fact that his schools and his military have trained over 10,000 people from this area.

I think that you have to take into account that Jordan has followed a rigid, determined policy of keeping its borders with Israel and the West Bank free of terrorists since 1971 when he destroyed the military power of the Fedayeen.

That record has only slipped something like two times over the last 5 years, and it certainly was through no fault of the Jordanians. From everything we can tell—and I would say that we could rely on what Israeli officials tell us as well—the Jordanians have kept that border quiet to the satisfaction of both parties.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I don't want to pursue this much further, but was the stability of his own country threatened in 1975? Is that why he took that course of conduct?

Mr. DRAPER. His regime was definitely under a challenge in 1970. No question.

The fact is, it is not only what he has done, but what do we want as Americans to have in Jordan when the time comes when a new page is turned in the present peace negotiations, which can open new opportunities?

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

Mr. ROSENTHAL. If he doesn't move in quickly, there is not going to be any pages to turn. The situation, is it improving or deteriorating?

Mr. DRAPER. If we can move over that next page, we will want to try to persuade King Hussein at that time to involve himself more actively.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you look optimistically on your ability to persuade him in the future, considering your enormous success in the past?

Mr. DRAPER. We think this is a reasonable, not necessarily overly optimistic course to follow.

We must have in Jordan a platform from which we can launch other stages of this peace process.

Jordan is absolutely indispensable to the kind of peace agreement Israel and the United States and other peace-loving states want.

Jordan has that absolutely unblemished track record since 1967 of being willing to make peace with Israel. We can't say that that is the case even with Egypt, because it was only after President Sadat came to power and through his trip to Jerusalem that some of the other obstacles were overcome.

King Hussein was ahead of virtually everyone in the Arab world. Perhaps only President Bourguiba has been more outspoken. That was back in the early 1960's when he spoke in favor of an accommodation with Israel.

I think that speaks well for this Arab leader. I must also emphasize that the price King Hussein has paid for his outspokenness and his willingness to make peace with Israel has been at times to make him a virtual pariah.

He has had to take criticism——

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What is he willing to do today? Honestly, Mr. Draper, you talk—respectfully—in bizarre generalities. What is he willing to do today?

Mr. DRAPER. To take one example, he will have an influence on the attitudes of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians. If we successfully complete the negotiations for a self-governing authority in those two areas, it will be critically important that King Hussein, in one form or the other, give the green light to his supporters there so they will in turn be willing to go to elections and stand as members on the governing council of that self-governing authority.

Now, shortly after the Camp David Accords and during the time when we were examining with King Hussein some of the questions and the answers we provided him to the meaning of the accords, King Hussein indicated, in a public fashion, through his Government statements that Jordan would not stand in the way of any Palestinian participation even in the negotiations as long as they made their decisions freely and without coercion.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Winn.

U.S. ARMS SALES TO JORDAN

Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't want to play the numbers game, but I do think that Mr. Bingham asked some very good questions, and I am not sure that

your answer was complete on numbers. And I am concerned about the same thing that Mr. Rosenthal is.

I think that the crux of the problem is Jordan's failure to join the peace process. How long do we wait? How many times do we let them come to the door and purchase planes, tanks, or whatever else before we give them a nudge and say, "OK, it is time for you to make the big move."

Mr. DRAPER. Mr. Winn, I think one impression should be corrected, and I will try to do this. That is, that we willy-nilly, irresponsibly, say yes to every Jordanian request. This is not the case.

Mr. Rosenthal, we crossed the Rubicon, for example, when we refused to consider for sale to Jordan certain advanced fighter aircraft. The Jordanians did go to the French, in this case, for an alternative aircraft.

Our relationship has been open and candid, but it has been complicated by disagreements and refusals on our part to supply everything.

When we do agree, as we have in the past, it has been an arrangement where we think that we continue to exert some influence. Other countries do not put any controls, paper or real, on the sale of their equipment. All of our equipment has controls, as all Members of Congress know, subject to our legislation and existing laws.

For the M–48's that we have been talking about being disposed of, for example, the kind of influence we have enjoyed with Jordan permits us to discuss frankly the disposal of those obsolescent tanks as others are brought in.

STATUS OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. WINN. If we don't sell to them, somebody else is going to sell the military equipment.

But I still question the administration's continued willingness to arm Jordan under the circumstances Jordan is not helping the Camp David peace process.

To me that is the whole thing.

Mr. DRAPER. Well, I won't deny, Mr. Winn, that we are disappointed.

Mr. WINN. How do we get them off dead center?

Mr. DRAPER. Much, I think, will depend on the progress ahead in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel on an autonomous regime.

Mr. WINN. They are just sitting stalled, going nowhere.

Mr. DRAPER. But we are not sitting on our hands, Mr. Winn.

Mr. WINN. I don't mean you are sitting. I mean those talks are stalled. But Jordan could get the talks off dead center by joining the peace process. Why don't they make a move and why doesn't this administration prod them to?

Why aren't we saying to Jordan, OK, it is time to make the move and to get those peace talks going. And its time for you, Jordan, to participate in them.

Mr. DRAPER. Let me put in one thought. One of the problems that the United States is facing today in the Middle East is that certain Arabs are waiting to see what will happen with the so-called European initiative. It is a distraction. We are concerned that many of them will delay making up their minds about next steps or be reluctant to enter

into a constructive dialog with us until they see how that so-called European initiative unfolds.

That isn't entirely answering the question, but it is an added complication that we have to face at this time.

We think that King Hussein is watching the outcome of the European moves.

Mr. WINN. He has sure been watching a long time.

Mr. DRAPER. But in the meantime Mr. Winn——

Mr. WINN. I agree with Ben. King Hussein is very charming. We all like the man. When he appeared, we all liked him. We like to hear from him. There just seems to be no movement.

Maybe this administration is stuck in concrete.

Mr. DRAPER. Well, we have to set the stage or keep the stage set for that time when he can involve himself more actively in the peace process.

In the meantime, it is very worthwhile to our interests that there are at least a few voices of moderation and caution in the Arab world as Arab groups meet together so frequently and so regularly and have to face suggestions and proposals by the rejectionists for boycotts, for economic measures, for other moves directed against Israel and the United States. These moderates have to stand together to prevent the rejectionists from swamping them in developing a new kind of Arab consensus. So far they have. We depend on Jordan, among other friends of ours, for that role and we appreciate the role that Jordan has played.

JORDAN'S MODERATION

Mr. WINN. What specific moderation on peace issues have you seen from Jordan in the last year?

Mr. DRAPER. I would include Jordan's behind the scene's role in the Islamic-Arabic conferences, including the most recent one in Rabat.

I would also include the statement——

Mr. WINN. What did they do there that changed that conference?

Mr. DRAPER. From what we understand there could have been an avalanche of emotion in the aftermath of the new law passed by the Knesset which could have gone to an extreme distance, to the kind of gigantic mistakes which the Arabs made in the Khartoum summit of 1967. Fortunately, the moderates were able to prevent this from happening and we understand Jordan was one of the voices of moderation.

We are frankly dealing with a very difficult situation in the Middle East at this time and we need the kind of help and support that these friends give us in their own way.

Mr. WINN. You have said that quite a few times. Some people still think there is a trend that Jordan is becoming less and less cooperative. Do you think that is true?

Mr. DRAPER. I do not feel that is true. I believe after King Hussein visited Washington on this last occasion a far better and far more constructive basis was established for our relationship which had been under some strain since the Camp David Accords.

Mr. WINN. Thank you very much.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Pease.

JORDAN'S RELUCTANCE TO ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. PEASE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Draper, I don't want to comment one way or another on whether this particular sale ought to be approved but I would like to ask you a couple of questions which I hope might illuminate the point that I think you have been trying valiantly to make this afternoon about King Hussein's position and Jordan's position in the Middle East.

Let's say that you and I are adversaries, we have been fighting each other. We're next door neighbors and fighting, and let's say that Congressmen Rosenthal and Bingham have been supporters of mine and we have been jointly throwing things at you in your yard.

There has been a peace and we are not doing that any more and now we are trying to work out some kind of a settlement where we can go on in a normal way.

If Mr. Rosenthal were to resist egging me on to start throwing things at you again, do you think that would be constructive from your point of view?

Mr. DRAPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. PEASE. If Mr. Rosenthal were to avoid egging on Mr. Bingham to egg me on, do you think that would be constructive?

Mr. DRAPER. No.

Mr. PEASE. You don't? If Mr. Rosenthal were making an effort to calm down Mr. Bingham so that he did not egg me on, do you think that would be helpful?

Mr. DRAPER. Yes.

Mr. PEASE. Would you be surprised if Mr. Rosenthal didn't really come over to your side and say, well, let bygones be bygones? Would you be surprised if he wanted to maintain a little distance between you and me?

Mr. DRAPER. I would not be surprised.

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Solarz is out of his chair for a moment.

Mr. WINN. You didn't let Republicans play at all, did you?

Mr. PEASE. It seems to me that basically that is what you have been talking about all afternoon. Jordan was part of the Middle East peace process before and after Camp David and could be part of the problem or could be part of the solution. One way it can be part of the solution is not to encourage other people who are more extreme in terms of their relations with Israel.

It seems to me that Jordan has done that. You have pointed that out in your testimony. It is a little surprising to me that you have to make that point so often.

We know, all of us, that Jordan is not the strongest nation in the Middle East by a long shot. We know that there are some highly volatile people living in Jordan. And we know that Jordan is subject to internal subversion encouraged by outside elements because of those conditions that we have mentioned.

In light of that, I guess it doesn't really surprise me that Jordan did not rush to become part of the Camp David peace process but preferred to wait and see if the process was going to work, if it was going to make satisfactory progress.

Again, it seems to me that is what you have been saying. For the life of me, while I am disappointed that Jordan has not participated

more actively and I am sure the administration is also, it doesn't surprise me a great deal. It would seem to me a little unrealistic to expect a person who is in a somewhat precarious position that King Hussein is in to march out and take the lead. I know that on the House floor we value a key Member of the House who can create a lot of difficulty for an amendment of ours if he will merely agree to be quiet and not raise a ruckus.

It seems to me King Hussein has been playing that role in that, as you point out in your testimony, even the moderating position that he has tried to take has come at some political cost to him among his Middle Eastern neighbors.

Is there something that I am missing that my colleagues are seeing? Do I analyze the situation correctly in your view or is there something wrong with my analysis?

Mr. DRAPER. No. I agree basically with your analysis of that situation. At the same time we do respect the concerns that have been expressed and we recognize that hard questions have to be answered. That is absolutely essential.

We think we in the administration have done just that.

Mr. PEASE. I quite agree with that. Even if my analysis is correct it may well be that you would say militarily the sale of the tanks does not make sense, upsets the balance or whatever, but in terms of conditioning it on what we expect of King Hussein in what he has delivered to us, it seems to me what he has delivered has been fairly realistic in terms of his own domestic and external situation as a small, weak nation with lot stronger neighbors in the Middle East.

Mr. DRAPER. I would like to add just one note there, Mr. Pease; that is, King Hussein has shown himself to be a man of great physical courage and he is willing to take initiatives, which makes us at least modestly optimistic that when the proper moment comes he will take some advance steps.

Mr. PEASE. I hope that is true also.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mrs. Fenwick.

PURPOSE OF TANK REQUEST

Mrs. FENWICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have some brief observations rather than questions. As I remember, we were assured that Jordan would not be equipped with laser rangefinders and so on. Further, in August last year Secretary Saunders said that he was assured by Jordan that they didn't want more than 734 tanks.

Why now does Jordan tell you they need 18 battalions? What is the purpose of getting these 800 tanks?

Mr. DRAPER. To the first part of your question, Mrs. Fenwick, the answer is that we were prepared in 1979 to provide tanks with the laser and computer fire control system but without the thermal sight. In 1980, a year later, we decided it would be possible and prudent to allow Jordan to have that thermal sight in addition to the other fire control system because we had provided that sight to Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other non-NATO friends.

Your citing Mr. Saunders' testimony is quite correct for 1979. In the year since then and after the Jordanian decision to purchase some

United Kingdom-built tanks, Jordanians told us that they wanted to move up to a full 18-battalion armored structure.

Mrs. FENWICK. Why?

Mr. DRAPER. They had discussed an 18-battalion structure as early as 1973. For reasons of their own, primarily relating to financial and human resources, they decided not to go to that figure.

Mrs. FENWICK. So their financial and human resources have improved?

Mr. DRAPER. After the period of 7 years they decided they would prefer to come up to a higher figure.

Mrs. FENWICK. It seems to me, Mr. Draper, that if we give equipment to one country. We feel we have to give them to another. Then we equalize by giving to the other, and then we have to give to those countries which are particularly friendly, or support Camp David something more than we do to those who do not.

It seems to me perfectly reasonable to give to those who support Camp David, some of the more elaborate equipment that other countries can't have. Then if they want more, they are going to have to be a little more supportive.

According to information I have here, the Jordan Prime Minister said that Resolution 242 is no longer adequate because the refugee denomination does not apply.

So it is perfectly clear to them why they are now rejecting 242.

It is old fashioned they say, due to the actions of the PLO. It apparently brought a new element into the Jordanian situation.

I think somewhere this has to stop. It is like a merry-go-round. It seems to me that the place to stop may be right here. We were told the tanks in Jordan did not need this equipment. They got part of it and now we are recommending giving the other.

We were told they didn't need more than 743 and now we are prepared to go along with more than 800.

I share my colleague's view. Hope is not enough anymore. Hope is not good enough. There has to be some concrete improvement. They keep raising the ante but we are getting nothing more than the status quo and the fact is if what the Prime Minister says is right, Jordan has taken a backward step.

I would like to depart from this line of questioning.

ENGINES AND AIRCRAFT FOR IRAQ

Is the State Department reconsidering those engines for Iraq?

Mr. DRAPER. I believe that discussions are still going on about this controversial issue.

Mrs. FENWICK. That also is going to destabilize the Persian Gulf and make difficulties for some of the neighboring countries, perhaps even including Jordan.

I wondered also about the 747 and 727's. They are commercial planes but certainly they can carry a lot of supplies and troops, and I wonder what the State Department position might be.

Mr. DRAPER. As regards the aircraft, we are in virtually daily contact with key Members of Congress who are interested in this sale. I believe you have been consulted.

Mrs. FENWICK. No.

Mr. DRAPER. I thought you had been.

Mrs. FENWICK. That is not vital.

I suppose what I am hoping for is a slightly different attitude, perhaps a little tougher, a little more success-oriented, so that you could report some splendid improvement as the reason why we ought to do what they request. "This is what they have done, not that we requested it but they knew our hopes lay in that direction."

I am troubled about another item also. Have you heard about those so-called flatbed agricultural trucks that went to Libya being used for military purposes?

Did you hear anything about that?

Mr. DRAPER. Yes, Mrs. Fenwick. We have some indications that some may be located in military compounds and may be transporting military cargo.

Mrs. FENWICK. It is very difficult. It is hard to tell whether they are to carry bags of shells or bags of wheat.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Bingham.

JORDAN AND THE PEACE PROCESS

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I won't take the full 5 minutes. I had some time before.

I hope you will take back to the Department what I think is clearly the deep concern of most of the members of this subcommittee and other members of the full committee who are here.

I, too, feel that Jordan has moved backward and that we not only have seen no progress but that we have seen a retrogression in Jordan's attitude. Even when they were saying 242 was the guideline, the King's interpretation of that was total Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines and he wouldn't enter discussions with Israel for peace talks unless that were understood as a precondition.

Isn't that right?

Mr. DRAPER. It is clear that his interpretation of 242 would mean ultimate Israeli withdrawal from virtually all of the occupied territories and with minor border rectifications. That was certainly the position he felt was correct.

But I don't think that he has tied his participation in negotiations to an advance understanding by Israel that it will just sign a paper and withdraw on that basis. He is more realistic than that.

Mr. BINGHAM. I wish you would recheck that, Mr. Draper. My impression is he has said that was a precondition, that Israel would have to agree to total withdrawal, and I don't believe he uses the words that you just used about virtually all or with minor modifications. He says total withdrawal before he would enter into discussion.

Let me ask you a question along a different line. If you felt that there was a likelihood of a new war breaking out in the Middle East in which Jordan would inevitably be involved, would you have the same attitude about the sale of these tanks?

Mr. DRAPER. I believe if we thought a new war was inevitable in the early future—this year, for example—that we would be taking a combination of steps, including trying to interrupt any kind of flow of arms to anywhere in the region.

We would certainly have to go all out to forestall such a terrible event and I think we would use every means of leverage at our disposal anywhere.

JIHAD

Mr. BINGHAM. Do you feel that Prince Fahd's statements about calling for jihad increases the likelihood of early hostilities in the area?

Mr. DRAPER. The way Prince Fahd appeared to present this concept, it was more in the form of a rhetorical question: Is jihad desirable?

The Saudis themselves have seen the overreaction to this comment and they have been busy in the past few days in saying what has to be needed now is the ending of quarrels among Arab brothers; there has to be a more uniform Arab stance.

Consequently, we have not assigned the highest possible significance to his comment on jihad although the rhetoric within this idea was noted seriously.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Solarz.

POSSIBLE REASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES–JORDANIAN RELATIONS

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Draper, do you recall the reassessment of our policy toward Jordan in which we engaged in 1975?

Mr. DRAPER. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Were you part of that reassessment?

Mr. DRAPER. I was here in Washington and watched what happened with great interest.

Mr. SOLARZ. Did you support it?

Mr. DRAPER. I wasn't part of the decision on what was called by the newspaper "the reassessment."

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you think, in light of Jordan's refusal to participate in the negotiations and the recent statement by the Prime Minister backing off from Resolution 242, that a reassessment of our policy toward Jordan might perhaps be in order?

Mr. DRAPER. I think it would be a serious mistake and contrary to the way in which we have worked out our differences with Jordan over the years. I think it would be comparable to shooting ourselves in the foot.

U.S. POLICY ON SELLING ARMS TO SYRIA

Mr. SOLARZ. That is what some people thought happened when we engaged in a reassessment aimed at Israel. Have we sold any military weapons to Syria?

Mr. DRAPER. No military weaponry; no, sir.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would we?

Mr. DRAPER. No. Our policy is not to supply military weaponry or equipment to Syria.

Mr. SOLARZ. Why not?

Mr. DRAPER. That has been our policy because of a need to keep the arms balance in the region, because of Syria's close relationship with the Soviet Union and Syria's virtually unlimited access to Soviet military equipment.

Mr. SOLARZ. Has our refusal to sell arms had anything to do with Syria's policies toward Israel and toward the peace process in the Middle East?

Mr. DRAPER. I don't think it has had a major effect on the Syrian policies toward Israel.

Mr. SOLARZ. No. Does our refusal to sell arms to Syria have anything to do with Syria's policy toward the peace process? Or is it simply a function of its relationship with the Soviet Union?

Mr. DRAPER. I think it is the latter, Mr. Solarz, but again, it is hard to say. If we took such a major step as to sell Syria military equipment, it would have to be in a milieu that is totally different from the present one. I don't know what could develop in such a hypothetical situation.

JORDAN AND RESOLUTION 242

Mr. SOLARZ. Was this statement made by the Prime Minister on Resolution 242 an authoritative expression of Jordanian policy?

Mr. DRAPER. The statement by the Jordanian Prime Minister—we checked this carefully because the initial press reports indicated Jordan was drawing away from 242—was that, no, Jordan does not reject 242. It still adheres to 242.

However, in the conditions of that moment, Jordan had acknowledged that 242 was imperfect in one respect, in that it did not deal adequately with the Palestinian question in all its dimensions.

The Prime Minister stated to us authoritatively and other Jordanian officials did also——

Mr. SOLARZ. Are you saying that subsequent to that interview which the Prime Minister gave, that the Prime Minister and other Jordanian officials have told us they still support Resolution 242?

Mr. DRAPER. That is correct. I think it is also worth making clear that there was a very strong effort during the Arab League and Islamic ministerial meetings in July to put forward a resolution totally rejecting 242 as a basis for a settlement.

Jordan was among the countries which worked against such a resolution as it has in the past and I think will in the future, but played a certain public relations role.

Mr. SOLARZ. I am delighted to hear they did that and I am glad to hear they told us they support Resolution 242. If that is the case, how can you possibly explain this interview? It is rather detailed and lengthy and consists from beginning to end of an analysis of the inadequacies of Resolution 242, including its inflexibility and its inadequacy as a basis for the achievement of peace in the Middle East. In fact, this statement seems to come out in favor of Resolution 181 as a more legitimate basis for agreement, even though Resolution 181 called for a peace between Israel and the Arabs based on the original partition resolution.

How do you accept this statement?

Mr. DRAPER. We are satisfied that Jordan adheres to 242 as a basis for the settlement. That position has not changed despite the temper tantrums and emotions that occur in conferences where they are dealing with such emotion-laden issues as Jerusalem and some of the positions of the Israeli Government.

Mr. SOLARZ. This statement was not made at an Arab conference where people were having temper tantrums. It was made in an interview that the Prime Minister granted.

Mr. DRAPER. But it was during that period when that one conference was being held. The point is that we went over this interview closely with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister told us, among other things, that Resolution 242 tackles some of the problem. We referred to a need to go beyond 242, which is not far distant from the traditional Jordanian position.

Jordan, over the last 4 years, has said 242 does not deal adequately with the Palestinian aspect.

PRINCE FAHD'S STATEMENT ON JIHAD

Mr. SOLARZ. One final question.

Have we sought any clarifications or explanations from Prince Fahd with respect to the Saudi statement concerning the need for jihad as a way of resolving the problem of Israel?

Mr. DRAPER. I am sorry; I don't know the answer to that question.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you supply us an answer for the record?

Mr. DRAPER. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. It would, frankly, be inconceivable to me if in fact we haven't sought such clarifications from the leaders of the country with which we have such close relations and on which we have posited so much of our policy in the Middle East, particularly since the statement on the face of it appears inconsistent with our own concerns and commitments in the region.

If you could let us know not only whether we made such inquiries but if we have, what the response has been, I think that would be helpful.

[The following was subsequently provided:]

CLARIFICATION OF CROWN PRINCE FAHD'S REPORTED CALL FOR JIHAD AGAINST ISRAEL

The Crown Prince's reference to "Jihad" was in the form of a rhetorical question in a statement made on a Muslim holy day. There is precedent for Saudi leaders calling for "Jihad" in response to the Jerusalem situation on religious holidays or in an Islamic forum. King Faisal on such an occasion issued a widely publicized call for "Jihad" ten years ago in response to the Jerusalem situation.

Although "Jihad" in its original sense means "holy war" the term took on a more general meaning in the 19th and 20th centuries to rally support for Arab nationalist struggles. In the Saudi context "Jihad" has come to mean political and propaganda action as well as a spirit of self-sacrifice.

The Saudi Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Information have sought to put the Crown Prince's statement into proper context by emphasizing Saudi Arabia's efforts to unify the Arab world. According to Prince Saud, the Foreign Minister, "Jihad" should not be interpreted as aggression or attack, but rather a call for the defense and protection of Arab rights by mobilizing all the political and economic weapons of the Arab and Muslim world.

Mr. DRAPER. Mr. Solarz, we have made inquiries. I wanted to be precise in my answer. I am not sure whether we talked to Prince Fahd himself but we certainly did talk to other members of the Saudi Government.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Draper, we appreciate your appearance today. Your period of anguish and agony will be shortened by the bells.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX 1

Biographies of Witnesses

Morris Draper

Morris Draper was born in California in 1928. He attended the University of California (B.A. in Political Science, 1952–Phi Beta Kappa) and did post-graduate work at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon, 1959–61. He served in the U.S. Army from 1946–47.

Mr. Draper joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1952. His diplomatic assignments have included: Executive Secretariat, 1952–54; Political Officer, Singapore, 1955–56; Political Secretary attached to the Baghdad Pact Secretariat, Baghdad, Iraq, 1957–59; Arabic language training, Beirut, Lebanon, 1959–61; Chief, Economic Section, Jidda, Saudi Arabia, 1961–64; Director, Foreign Service Training Branch, Personnel Department, Department of State, 1964–66; Turkish Desk Officer, 1966–68; Head, Cyprus Task Force, 1967; Political Counselor, Amman, Jordan, 1968–70; Political Counselor, Ankara, Turkey, 1970–74; Special Assistant in Charge of Special Projects, 1974–76; Country Director for Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon 1976–78. Mr. Draper was appointed to his present position in August, 1978.

Mr. Draper speaks Arabic and French, plus some Turkish and Spanish. He received a Meritorious Honor Award in 1967.

Lt. Gen. Ernest Graves

Lieutenant General Ernest Graves is a graduate of West Point, holds a Ph. D. in physics from MIT, and attended the Harvard Business School. He commanded a combat engineer platoon in Europe in World War II, an engineer construction battalion in Korea, and an engineer group in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam.

A substantial portion of his career has been devoted to the development of military and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His last job in the nuclear program was Director of Military Application for the ALC and ERDA in 1974–75.

He served previously in Washington as Executive to the Secretary of the Army, as Deputy Director of Military Construction in the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and as President of the Air Defense Evaluation Board.

In the early 1970's General Graves was Division Engineer for the Army Corps of Engineers on the Great Lakes and the Upper Mississippi River. He became Director of Civil Works for the Corps in September 1975 and moved up to Deputy Chief of Engineers in July 1977.

General Graves became the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, on March 1st, 1978. In this position he is responsible for managing and administering the multi-billion dollar security assistance programs carried out by the Department of Defense.

Hon. Harold H. Saunders

Harold H. Saunders, of Pennsylvania, was sworn in April 11, 1978, as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Mr. Saunders was appointed Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department in December 1975. Previous to this appointment, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs from July 1974 through November 1975, where his special area of responsibility

included the states of North Africa, the Arab states north of the Arabian Peninsula and Israel. He came to the State Department from the National Security Council Staff in the White House.

Mr. Saunders was born in Philadelphia in 1930 and grew up there. He received his A.B. from Princeton in 1952 and a Ph. D. from Yale in 1956 in American Studies. He served as an officer in the U.S. Air Force from 1958–59, was detailed to the Central Intelligence Agency, and stayed on until 1961 as a civilian after release from active duty. Between 1959 and 1965 he also taught evening classes in American history in the College of General Studies of the George Washington University.

Mr. Saunders joined the National Security Council Staff in 1961 working on the Near East, South Asia, and North African areas, and became senior staff member for that area in 1967. He has accompanied Secretaries Kissinger and Vance on all of their Mid-East trips and participated in the Arab-Israeli negotiations in 1973–75 as well as accompanying the Secretary or the President on trips to Europe, South Asia, Moscow, Vladivostok, Peking, Africa, and Latin America in the period of 1969–78.

Mr. Saunders is a widower with two children, Catherine and Mark.

APPENDIX 2

NOTIFICATION OF ARMS SALE TO JORDAN

JULY 23, 1980.

To: Members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
From: John J. Brady, Jr., Chief of Staff.
Subject: Notification Pursuant to Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act

Pursuant to Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, the Committee on Foreign Affairs has received notification that the United States proposes to sell defense articles to Jordan.

Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires the President to notify the Congress that he intends to issue a letter of offer to sell to a foreign country or international organization defense articles or defense services valued at $25 million or more, or any major defense equipment for $7 million or more, 30 calendar days before the letter of offer can be issued. The notifications are now accompanied by policy justifications, which are available for your review in the Full Committee office, Room 2170 Rayburn.

The text of the transmittal follows:

TRANSMITTAL NO. 80-82

NOTICE OF PROPOSED ISSUANCE OF LETTER OF OFFER PURSUANT TO SECTION 36(b) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Jordan.
(ii) Total Estimated Value:

	Millions
Major defense equipment*	$156.5
Other	3.0
Total	159.5

*As included in the U.S. Munitions List, a part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

(iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered: One hundred (100) M60A3 tanks.
(iv) Military Department: Army (VAZ).
(v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc. Paid, Offered or Agreed to be Paid: None.
(vi) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Articles or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Annex in Room 2170 Rayburn.
(vii) Section 28 report: Included in report for quarter ending June 30, 1980.

APPENDIX 3

TEXT OF HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 396

[H. Con. Res. 396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.]

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Disapproving the proposed sale to Jordan of one hundred M60A3 tanks and related defense articles and services (Transmittal Numbered 80–82)

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress objects to the proposed sale to Jordan of one hundred M60A3 tanks and related defense articles and services, such proposed sale being described in the certification submitted by the President, pursuant to section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on July 23, 1980 (Transmittal Numbered 80–82).

APPENDIX 4

Statement of Representative William M. Brodhead on the Proposed Sale of Tanks to Jordan

Mr. Chairman: I appreciate this opportunity to express my strong opposition to the sale of M–60 tanks to Jordan. I am pleased that the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East has chosen to hold hearings on this matter, and I hope that the hearings will result in a Congressional disapproval of the sale.

Arms sales far too seldom promote the cause of peace, and there is little basis in the recent history of the Middle East to believe that Jordan would use these tanks for solely defensive purposes. The United States, Israel, and Egypt are committed to working toward a just and lasting peace through the framework established at the Camp David Summit meeting. Under this framework, unprecedented progress toward such a peace settlement has been made. Jordan, however, has rejected the Camp David approach. In my view, to sell these advanced tanks to Jordan would be to augment Jordan's military power at the direct expense of Israel's security, and it would undermine the stability of the region as a whole.

I believe that at the very least, a sincere desire for peace should be a prerequisite for purchasing arms from the United States. By refusing to endorse or participate in the Camp David peace process, Jordan has raised grave questions about its motives and intentions, and I do not believe that there is good reason to permit this arms sale.

Our country can best demonstrate its commitment to peace by playing an even-handed role in the Middle East peace process while refusing to waiver from its support for the security of Israel. I do not feel that the proposed tank sale serves either of these goals, and I hope that the Subcommittee will recommend its rejection.

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